

THE HUMAN WILL:

A SERIES OF POSTHUMOUS ESSAYS ON MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF PUNISHMENT, AND THE POWERS OF THE WILL.

BY THE LATE

JAMES POLLARD ESPY,

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The Dice of God are always loaded.

—*Greek Proverb.*

Hell is the Love-spark that burneth up the mountain of Iniquity.

—*Mohammed.*

I think that only is real which men love and rejoice in; not what they tolerate, but what they choose; what they embrace and avow, and not the the things which chill, benumb and terrify them.

—*Emerson.*

MEMOIR.

JAMES ESPY was born on the ninth day of May, 1786, in Washington county, Pennsylvania. He was the youngest of ten children, and the seventh son, having been born when his mother was nearly fifty years of age. His parents removed to the State of Kentucky, when he was in his fourth year, and settled at Lexington. He was born an inquirer. During this journey with his parents westward, the boat was shoved suddenly from the Brownsville wharf, and little James as suddenly floored. During the rest of the trip down the Ohio, no novelties could distract his mind from a pertinacious resolution to find out the principle by which he had fallen; and when some one told him that his centre of gravity had been lost, his mind started at once on a voyage of investigation, which ceased only with his life. In his earliest school-days, a severe storm blew a large tree down on the top of the school-house, breaking the timbers and roof; into the brain of our boy-philosopher, as its proper crucible, the storm fell, and there remained until he had wrested its secret. His thirst for knowledge was from his childhood insatiable; and his means being limited, he began whilst yet in his teens teaching, during a portion of each year, to pay for the instruction received in the Transylvania University of Lexington, where he was graduated at the age of twenty-one. During the year following he was invited to Cumberland, Maryland, to take charge of a classical academy of that city, which had been newly endowed by the Legislature. His zeal for instructing the young was such that he soon made it a well-known institution, to which students came from every part of the country. Having saved something by this, he went to Bedford, and pursued the study of the Law.

At the age of twenty-seven he was married to MARGARET POLLARD, of Cumberland, whose maiden-name he assumed, and was ever after known as JAMES POLLARD ESPY. He took his bride, who was then only sixteen, to Xenia, Ohio, where he resided for four years in the practice of the law. But it became manifest to him that this profession did not accord with the literary and scientific tendencies of his mind; so he was quite ready to accept a call to the classical department of the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia. Thither he went in the year 1817, and that city became his home for twenty years.

His position here was excellently adapted to his intellectual wants. He was a man of science by nature; and here he found a centre where the facts upon which he wished to experiment could be easily obtained and classified. His mind had for some time been attracted to his specialty; and the world became suddenly aware how far he had gone toward changing meteorology from a speculation, but little more respectable than alchemy, into a positive science, by his

invention of the NEPHELOSCOPE, a very simple and accurate instrument by which the expansion of air attributable to latent caloric can be perfectly measured. At this time he published several pamphlets, reviewing and rejecting the theories of storms and currents which prevailed: these attracted notice because of their clear style and great power of analysis, and the savants of New England and Philadelphia began to look to Franklin Institute for some theory which should take the place of those which had been so remorselessly disposed of. By this time, also, Prof. ESPY had formed his own theory, and brought it practically to the test of many storms. Being convinced of its truth, he announced it in a series of lectures in Philadelphia. These lectures were soon called for in other centres of science; and at length it became necessary for him to abandon Franklin Institute, and devote himself to scientific pursuits alone.

We have not space here for an analysis of the Professor's Theory of Storms, which has now become the prevailing one. Its theme is quite simple: He supposes that when the air near the surface of the earth becomes more heated or more highly charged with aqueous vapor, which is only five-eighths of the specific gravity of atmospheric air, its equilibrium is unstable, and up-moving columns or streams will be formed. As these columns rise, their upper parts will come under less pressure, and the air will, therefore, expand; as it expands it will grow colder, about one degree and a quarter for every hundred yards of its ascent, as he demonstrated by experiments in the Nepheloscope. The ascending columns will carry up with them the aqueous vapor which they contain, and, if they rise high enough, the cold produced by expansion from diminished pressure will condense some of this vapor into cloud; for it is known that cloud is formed in the receiver of an air-pump when the air is suddenly withdrawn. The distance to which the air will have to ascend before it will become cold enough to begin to form cloud, is a variable quantity, depending on the number of degrees which the dew-point is below the temperature of the air; and this height may be known at any time, by observing how many degrees a thin metallic tumbler of water must be cooled down below the temperature of the air before the vapor will condense on the outside.

Professor ESPY'S account of the generation of winds at the time of a storm, was equally simple: the air rushes from all sides to the centre of the ascending columns, and in conjunction with this, the air is depressed around the columns, and brings down the motion which is known to be greater as air is above the earth's surface. His theories of the annulation of clouds, the interior passage for winds through the cone-centre of tornadoes, are beautiful, and agree with the facts in the case. But we can not dwell upon them. No one interested in the subject will be without his great work, *The Philosophy of Storms*, published by Little & Brown, Boston, during the year 1841. Before its publication in this form, the new theory had caused a sensation in the principal cities of England and France, and Professor ESPY was invited to visit Europe, and compare his results with those which had been reached by Redfield, Forbes, Pouillet, Fournet and others.

He accordingly visited Europe, and in September, 1840, the British Association appointed a day to entertain the Professor's statement, which was made in the presence of Prof. Forbes, Mr. Redfield, Sir John Herschel, Sir David Brewster, and other eminent naturalists. The discussion which followed was one of the most interesting ever reported in the Journals of the Association. In the Academy of Sciences, at Paris, the interest was equally great, and a committee,

consisting of Arago and Pouillet, was appointed to report upon Espy's observations and theory. They were satisfied of the importance of the theory at once, and so reported. It was in the debate which took place in the Academy at this time, that Arago said, "France has its Cuvier, England its Newton, America its Espy." On his return from this satisfactory visit, Professor Espy was appointed corresponding member of the Smithsonian Institute. From that time until his death he resided in Washington, beloved and honored by all who knew him. His more recent discoveries will be given to the world, doubtless, by those who have charge of them; one of them, relating to electricity, is quite interesting and important. We now turn to another side of his life, and one of paramount interest.

Mr. Espy's parents were devout members of the Presbyterian Church, and as that Church had not in those days adopted the compliant system now in vogue, which aspires to carry the Westminster Confession on one shoulder, and the spirit and science of the age on the other, he received a quite strict and religious training. The Bible was his daily study, and he learned the New Testament by rote. But we have seen that he was a realist at birth. One day, having read in the Testament the words "whatsoever ye shall ask in my name that ye shall receive," he went out into the garden alone, and, extending his hand upward, said, "O God, give me a dollar!" His surprise and pain that the dollar did not drop into his hand from the clouds was great. Then Doubt quietly entered, took her seat, and henceforth every text must needs pass under her hand, and bear her questionings. Skeptic means, by etymology, 'one who considers a thing:' consequently skeptics are rarely orthodox. Professor Espy, when he had passed through the waves of doubt, found himself on the strong shores where Faith marries Reason; and their progeny of high thoughts and holy aspirations arose within him. His mind at first, and entirely by its own operations, arrived at a complete faith in the existence and benevolence of God: then adieu, O parental Church, with thy doctrine of the angry God and the endless torments! But he did not pause with the speculative Epicurists, who care to follow an idea only so far as it makes things easy, and lays the fear-phantoms; he went farther than to reject the idea that endless torment awaited any immortal child of God; he developed the most perfect system of Optimism which has yet been announced. There is no evil: God is good; God is over all: all is for the best. This was his theme, and he was wont with those who knew him to dwell on it with a convincing power and eloquence which easily arose to majesty. This storm-king, as he was called, had not gone forth to discover the pathways of the lightning and survey the inviolable channels of wind and storm, and returned to believe that the Chaos, driven from the external world forever, prevailed yet in the storms and winds of the inward and human world. He saw that the passions, the impulses, the motives, had their law, and that there was no chance-work but to empyrics, no Chaos but to the ignorant. These views gradually wrote themselves through his experience and life, and have bequeathed us the following work. In it his distinction, beyond the production of a clear, simple and logical essay on a much confused subject, is, that he shows that so far from Necessity annihilating responsibility, as is alleged, Necessity alone makes responsibility possible.

On the 17th day of January last, Professor Espy was stricken with paralysis: he was nearly seventy-four years of age, and it was scarcely expected by his friends, that even a constitution so vigorous as his, a constitution which had never been

wronged by a bad habit of any kind, could vanquish the violent foe. When he was in pain, and could scarcely speak, he was heard to whisper, "I have *tried to will* to move that limb, and can not." No paralytic stroke could strike to the seat of thought and conviction! Never in such a condition have we known a mind to remain so active and so healthy in its tone to the last. As we looked upon the snowy locks of the pure old man, we felt how truly the ancient poet described such as "the white blossoms of eternal fruit." He died January 24th.

The character of Professor Espy was as pure and elevated as any which it has been our happiness to meet. His word, with those who met him, was truth itself; his innocence was like that of a child; he lived and died without ever being willing to suspect those whom others saw to be jealous of his position and influence. His benevolence was not only large and true, but it was equaled by his affectionateness and tenderness toward those who were appointed in the order of God to minister and be ministered to in the circle of his life.

When the immortal old man was drawing near to his end, the writer of this memoir stood by him, amongst other friends, anxious for a last word. The old man could not speak a word, but presently moved his fingers as if he would write. Pencil and paper having been brought, he wrote some words in almost illegible scratches. It took us some hours to decipher them, but at last, letter added to letter, a sublime sentence shone with clear ray upon us; it ran: "I have found in human nature a principle superior to conscience. Conscience can be taught that it is right to burn heretics: Instinct can not be taught not to feel pain at the sight of suffering."

There it is, O reader! a voice from the mysterious boundary-line between the darkness of earth and the light of the superior world. We who received it, bear witness that by that principle a living and beautiful soul climbed to bloom and cluster in the light of God.

The will which he left does so perfectly repeat the practical aim and spirit of his whole life, that we record its opening paragraphs here:

"In the beginning of this, my last will and testament, I wish to express my most profound reverence for the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, and my unwavering belief that everything which I have experienced during my whole life (as well the painful as the pleasant) has been so arranged by His infinite goodness and wisdom, as to result in good to me, by educating me to a higher state of knowledge, and to a more intense love of goodness, and so to prepare me for an eternity of happiness after death. If it is better for me to exist happy after death, I shall so exist, as certainly as there is a God of infinite goodness, wisdom and power; and if it is better for me to suffer some pain hereafter for the sake of further improvement, I doubt not that an infinitely wise and good Father has arranged that I shall so suffer.

"Heavenly Father, with unwavering confidence in Thy love, I commit myself and the whole human family, Thy children, to Thy holy keeping."

MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

SCIENCE has demonstrated that this earth was once fluid, from heat, to the surface; it follows that man has not existed on this earth from eternity, and it is manifest that the first man had not a man for his father, nor the first woman a woman for her mother; and as there is no known cause now in existence to produce man, but that of ordinary generation, and it is plainly impossible for him to have originated from any fortuitous concourse of atoms, we are constrained to believe that the first man and first woman were contrived and brought into existence by a being of superior wisdom, power and goodness. And as this same reason applies to all the animals and vegetables on the face of the earth, we may safely infer that the power, wisdom and goodness of this being are indefinitely great. This inference is greatly confirmed, when we discover innumerable contrivances, both in the moral and physical world, all tending to the well-being of man.

Now all these contrivances imply a contriver, and unless this contriver was himself contrived, he must have been eternal. For it is certain, that the first cause or contriver always existed, for if there was ever a time when nothing existed, nothing could ever have been brought into existence — *ex nihilo nihil fit.* This first self-existent and eternal cause or contriver is called God, whether the immediate contriver of the universe was the self-existent eternal first cause or not. But as nothing is gained by supposing that the contriver of the universe, and the former of man, was himself or itself contrived, it is unphilosophical to make the supposition.

When we examine the nature of man, we discover that he is so constituted or contrived, that the fundamental law of his nature is to be *fond of pleasure and averse to pain.* Indeed, as a sensitive being, it would seem he could not be formed otherwise. We find,

also, that he is so contrived as to be able to discover by degrees more and more the causes which produce pleasure, and the causes which produce pain. The sum of human happiness is much increased by the contrivance God has made, that one of the principal sources of man's enjoyment is doing good to others, or endeavoring to increase their happiness. We find, also, that doing evil to others, or even designing to do evil, is always attended with pain, and no doubt more suffering is felt by the evil-doer than by the one to whom the evil is done.

God has so formed the human race, that one man's true interest or well-being never clashes with another's; or, in other words, one man is never under the necessity of diminishing the well-being of another, to promote his own happiness.

If man was so constituted that he could promote his own happiness by diminishing that of others, the very constitution of man would then be a species of bribery in God, offering happiness as a reward for doing evil to others. If God is perfectly wise and perfectly good, he has not so constituted man. Indeed, if we allow that the great First Cause is without intelligence and incapable of design, and that man was formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms, which is infinitely improbable, still by examining his constitution as it is we will be obliged to acknowledge that doing good to others is a source of pleasure, and doing evil to others is a source of pain. If man is never under the necessity of doing evil to others, or of diminishing their happiness to increase his own, *a fortiori*, God is never under the necessity of diminishing the happiness of one man for the good of another.

Pain of every kind which does not result in the ultimate good or well-being of the individual suffering it, is an evil to him, and, of course, it can not promote the well-being of others; and if inflicted by others, it will diminish their happiness, probably, more than it does that of the individual on whom it is inflicted. All punishment, therefore, ought to be inflicted with the intention of benefiting the individual punished; for if it results in diminishing the well-being of the individual punished, it certainly will diminish the well-being of those who inflicted it — more especially if the punishment is inflicted without regard to the well-being of the sufferer.

Punishment, therefore, to be just and useful (and it can not be just without being useful), should be prospective, and not retro-

spective ; and it contains a false and dangerous doctrine to say a man ought to be punished *for* his transgressions, if this form of speech is understood literally. The truth is, he ought to be punished only *for* the sake of reformation or discipline, — and this is the only mode in which God ever punishes, as will appear more fully hereafter.

This doctrine, when once admitted, will remove all vengeance from the mind ; and every one will see, that to punish with the feelings of vengeance is to punish oneself. Thus the criminal code of all nations will be freed from its foulest blot, the open avowal and practice of the principle that it is just to punish for the good of the community — in some cases, at least — without any regard to the good of the criminal. This is the most pernicious doctrine that can possibly be inculcated and embraced ; for it teaches men to believe, from their infancy to manhood, that they may (at least, sometimes) benefit themselves by diminishing the well-being of others : and it never occurs to them that it is false ; for it is a doctrine embraced by the State, and lies at the very foundation of their criminal code.

The extreme perniciousness of this principle will clearly appear, when we perceive, as we may by a little consideration, that *from this one error all our wicked conduct to others arises.* Remove the belief that we can benefit ourselves by doing evil to others, and implant in its place the belief that we shall be the principal sufferers by such conduct, then all motive to do evil to others is at once cut off, and with the absence of motive the action will, of course, not be performed. If this doctrine is true, the evil done to a community by one legalized murder (the execution of a criminal) is infinitely greater than the most atrocious murder ever committed by an individual, because it teaches, in the most effectual manner, the principle from which all murders and other crimes arise ; and, besides, the moral feeling of the community, by the practice of capital punishments, is rendered callous, to a degree beyond calculation.

Men are so constructed by the Creator that they perform every day thousands of good actions, without considering for a moment whether happiness or misery will be the result ; but they seldom, if ever, commit a crime without calculating the consequences : Their moral arithmetic, however, deriving its rules of calculation

from the criminal code of nations, is false, and they determine to do evil to their fellow-creature from the expectation of increasing their own well-being. In this expectation they must fail, as certainly as a just God stands at the head of the universe; for it would be in the highest degree wicked to bribe his creatures with happiness as a reward or consequence of doing evil one to another. As it is manifestly not good for an individual to be punished for any crime, when it is impossible for that punishment to work reformation or benefit to the individual in any other way, so it is manifestly unjust to inflict such punishment, and it would be infinitely unjust to continue such punishment to all eternity.

God being perfectly wise and perfectly good, he must, from his very nature, intend to do some good in everything which he does; whenever he punishes any of his creatures, therefore, or, which is the same thing, causes pain to be the necessary consequence of crime, he must intend to do that creature good by the pain, more especially as this is the only way to improve the individual, and thus also to benefit others.

As God certainly does punish — that is, cause pain to be the inevitable consequence of certain actions, which we therefore call evil actions — we are sure he will succeed in doing the good which he intends by that punishment; for he is all-wise to lay his plan, and all-powerful to execute it. Now the only good conceivable to result from punishment is the reformation of the individual, or the happiness of others; and as these are inseparable, the reformation of the individual must be effected. Nor is it difficult to conceive *how* this is done. God has made man fond of happiness, and averse to misery; it is a law of his nature which never varies. He can not change it, either by volition or crime; he can not will to hate happiness and love misery any more than he can suspend gravitation by a word of command.

God has made man also with an intellect capable of finding out by experience more and more of those things which produce misery, and also more and more of those things which produce happiness. Now the wiser he becomes, the wiser will be his volitions; that is, the more and more of those things which produce happiness he will choose, and the more and more of those things which produce misery he will avoid; and when he becomes perfectly wise, if that time shall ever come, he will then by no possibility

choose to do any wicked action, because a perfectly wise being can not choose to make a foolish volition. Nor does this impossibility of choosing to make foolish or wicked volitions in the slightest degree impair his free agency; for, on such a supposition, God is not a perfect free agent, as, from the very perfection of his nature, he can not choose to make a foolish or wicked volition, or perform any wicked action. It has been thought by some that free agency, or moral accountability, implies at least the possibility of choosing to do either good or evil; but this can not be, for, on this plan, God would not be a free agent; and man, too, would be less and less a free agent the wiser he became, and when he became perfectly wise, he would cease to be a free agent altogether. It is maintained also by some, that it would be unjust in God to cause pain to follow as a consequence of any action, if that action could not have been avoided. So far from this being correct, it will appear by a little reflection that it is entirely consistent with the highest benevolence to cause pain to follow the commission of crimes, or the formation of wicked volitions, as this is the only means of enabling the agent to make good volitions in future. It may perhaps be objected that God could not have intended to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness when he created man, or he would have created him so perfect in knowledge that he never could choose to do any act from which pain would result. It may be answered that God is only beginning to create man when he is born; and that it is impossible, so far as we know, to create him faster in knowledge than he is actually being created, whilst he remains in this world. And, besides, we may safely infer, that if it would be better for man to have been created in any other way, God, from his infinite perfections, would have chosen that way.

The justice of punishment does not depend on the fact that it was possible for the individual punished to have avoided the crime committed, but rather on the fact that the being who is punished is created with powers and capacities which may be operated on by the punishment itself, so as to render it possible and even certain, that, with the new motives introduced by the punishment, or by the pain following the commission of the crime, as an effect, he will be finally taught to avoid the crime *in future*. Unless the individual punished is so created, all punishment would be useless to him, and, of course, useless to others. If retrospective punish-

ment could cause a crime which has been committed not to be, then it might be useful; but this is impossible and absurd. Nor is the absurdity of punishing retrospectively lessened by supposing that the individual punished could have avoided doing the criminal act; for, even on that supposition, the act once done can not be prevented, nor in any way altered by the punishment.

On some of the points here discussed the human mind seems to be differently constituted, and to take different views, after the most careful and patient examination. Some think that though God knew from all eternity all the actions which I perform in my whole life, yet I might have avoided many of them, if not all, and might perform an entirely different set; otherwise it would be unjust in God to cause pain or punishment to be the result of any of them. Others acknowledge that foreknowledge implies inevitability; but as foreknowledge is not the cause of the inevitability, they think God may be just in punishing for crimes or vices, provided he only foresaw these vices, but did not decree them. Now my mind is so constituted that it appears to me that if our actions were foreknown to God from all eternity, they must have been decreed by him. For foreknowledge implies the certainty that the event foreknown will come to pass. Now this certainty, or, which is the same thing, this inevitability of the event, must have been caused by something in God, or something out of God. If it was something in God, it must have been his decree or determination, either to cause the events to come to pass, or to bring into existence a set of causes which would certainly bring into existence the events foreknown; for, if there was no certainty that the events would take place, then they could not be foreknown. Now, if God decreed to bring these effects into existence, or to bring a set of causes into existence which he knew would certainly produce the effects, then may he be said to have decreed the effects. On the other hand, if God did not decree to bring the effects foreknown into existence himself by his direct agency, nor to create any set or train of causes which would certainly produce the effects foreknown, then something out of God was the cause of the certainty, on which God's foreknowledge was founded, or which God's foreknowledge implies. Now, whatever this something is, it must be superior to God in power, for it is supposed to have caused a most important train of events in the moral world to be certain, and that, too, independent of any agency in God. Nay,

more : not only will they come into existence without the agency of God, but he has no power to hinder them ; for that can not be prevented from coming to pass which any being knows will certainly come to pass. To believe, then, that God foresaw the future actions of men, and at the same time to deny that he was himself the cause of that certainty or inevitability that the events foreknown would take place, on which the foreknowledge was founded, leads to atheism, or at least to a belief that God is a very weak and imperfect being ; for, inasmuch as it is assumed that the certainty or inevitability was not caused by him, and as it is clear that, when an inevitability is once in existence, the thing inevitable can not be prevented from coming to pass, the Deity is left powerless in regard to the events taking place or not taking place. If it is said that the inevitability arose from something out of God, but that the subsequent agency of God had to be employed to bring the very beings into existence whose acts were inevitable, and thus he was not powerless in relation to these acts, still, even on this scheme, there would be a power above God, which is atheism. Or, if this power, which causes things to be inevitable, does this with intelligence and goodness, then this power is God, and the being who creates man is an inferior agent, which the superior uses to execute his plans, and bring into existence those things which he had rendered inevitable, or, which is the same thing, which he had decreed.

Another will object to all these views, and say the only plan to render man a free agent is to suppose that there is no certainty or inevitability, which amounts to the same thing, as it relates to its influence on the character of actions, and consequently there can not be a foreknowledge of the actions of a free agent. This view is founded, as was said before, on the assumption that free agency, or moral accountability, implies the possibility of choosing to do either right or wrong, in every case, where a choice is made ; or, as it is vaguely expressed, the agent is free to choose the right or the wrong. If those who take this view of the subject will institute a careful examination of what can be meant here by the word "*free*," they will, I think, find reason to change their views. If they suppose that the volitions are free from the intelligence and passions of the agent, and also free from the desire of happiness or aversion to misery, which is the universal law of all beings endowed with feeling, then is there no such thing as that kind of

free agency for which they contend. If they come to the conclusion, as I think they must by such an examination, that our volitions are not entirely free from the influence of our state of mind as to intelligence, and our clearness of view as to the character of the object, to produce happiness or misery, at the time of willing or choosing, then I desire them to push the inquiry still further, and inquire how *much* influence the intelligence and state of mind may exercise on the volitions or choices which the agent makes, without destroying his freedom or moral accountability.

In pursuing this inquiry to its utmost extent, my mind leans strongly to the conviction that all the time man is increasing in wisdom and goodness, the possibility of his making foolish and wicked volitions is constantly diminishing, and his power to make wise and good volitions is increasing in the same proportion, and thus all that kind of agency or power of acting which is of any value is retained and augmented. And whether any one may choose to call this power of making volitions under the influence of wisdom and goodness free agency or not, is a matter of little consequence, provided the fact itself is clearly perceived.

If we push our inquiry still further, we will perceive that our volitions, like all things which begin to exist, are produced by causes adequate to produce them, each particular volition depending on its own particular set of causes, adequate to produce that very volition and no other at the time. The particulars going to make up the cause are numerous, and if any one of the particulars should be removed, the particular volition made at that time would be different. For example, suppose we make a volition which is the result of much deliberation. It is manifest that there are three particulars coëxisting as causes of this volition, and that if any one of them had been wanting at the time, the volition could not have been made. These three are the being who chooses or wills, the object of the choice, and the intelligence with which the deliberation is made. Other particulars, doubtless, enter into the complex compound going to make up the cause of the volition, and whatever they may be, they are adequate to produce the particular volition, and no other. Now, it is manifest that the particular volition of which we are speaking is inevitably produced by its complex cause at the moment it comes into existence; and, therefore, if free agency depends upon the possibility of making a different volition every time we make a volition, then

free agency in that sense does not, and can not exist. Nor is it desirable that such a free agency should exist, for a being so constituted that his intelligence should not influence his volitions, would be a monstrosity of which we could form no conception — certainly he would not be a moral agent. Such a being could never be taught, and even if he could become intelligent, his intelligence would be of no use, for his volitions not being influenced by his understanding, he would be as likely to make foolish or ignorant volitions after he became intelligent as before. But the proposition is so absurd in itself that it seems impossible to attempt to reason from it without uttering absurdities. It is almost as if we were to suppose our uncle to be our aunt, and then to endeavor to find out what would be the consequences of such a supposition.

There is another consequence flowing from the supposition that there is not a necessary and indissoluble connection between the volitions and the causes of those volitions, which the advocates of this view of the subject little suspect. It is, that man on this principle would not be an accountable being; or, in other words, it would be utterly useless to punish him after he had committed any crime, with the expectation that the punishment would be of any use. It is true, punishment would produce new views, if it was so arranged that he would perceive it to follow as a consequence of the transgression: but what good would that do? His future volitions, according to the supposition, could not be affected by these new views. Thus it appears that the very principle which those who advocate this view of the subject bring forward as the very essence of moral accountability, would render accountability absurd if it was true. Indeed, the only scheme on which moral accountability can be founded is that of the necessary connection between cause and effect; or the doctrine that the volitions are dependent on causes, and that among these causes is the state of intelligence and a knowledge of the consequences which will flow from the volitions themselves.

On this supposition, if a man should violate the law of God — that is, the law of his own nature — it would be useful, just and benevolent in the Deity to cause pain to be the immediate result, so that this new knowledge might become a new cause of producing a volition corresponding to the law of God on the next occasion. This, in fact, is the only mode which could be adopted to educate him out of a state of ignorance into a state of knowledge;

and the more rapidly he committed transgressions, and the more rapidly the consequent pain came upon him, the faster it would seem he would rise into knowledge and happiness. On the contrary, if God had made man so that no pain would follow the transgression of his laws, but pleasure, then would man never learn to avoid transgression. And the consequences of such an arrangement are as impossible to foresee as it would be to foresee the consequences which would follow if our uncle were our aunt. On this subject, to know what *is*, is the only science. Is it a fact that pain is a consequence of the transgression of God's laws? Is it a fact that this pain has a tendency to educate us into a knowledge of those laws? Is it not better that we should be educated on this subject, than remain ignorant? Could we be so educated if pain did not follow transgression as an effect follows its cause? Many would be willing to admit that, provided men do transgress, it is better pain should follow, for the reason assigned above; but they can not admit that it is *better to transgress* — and this is the chief reason why they are unwilling to believe that God decreed the transgression. If, indeed, it proved that God is a malevolent being, provided he has decreed transgressions of his law, as well as the pain which follows these transgressions, then no argument, however strong, would be sufficient to satisfy the mind of the certainty of such decrees. It would remain forever perplexed between the force of the argument, and the absurdity of the conclusion. It is not probable, *a priori*, that God has created the human mind so as to remain in a state of perplexity forever on so important a point. The search for truth is indeed one of the highest enjoyments of the human mind; and I can well appreciate the saying of one who delighted in the study of God's works, when he declared, "If God should hold out *Truth* to him in one hand, and the *search for Truth* in the other, and allow him to take his choice, he would say, Give me the *search for Truth*." Much of our pleasure, however, in the search for truth, arises from the continual discoveries of truth itself, and from the hope of making more. But if we should despair of ever arriving at the truth on a particular subject, our pleasure in the search would cease, and with the termination of the pleasure the search itself would cease.

How much of our happiness in a future state of existence will depend on the search for truth, we have no means of knowing.

Perhaps we may *there* be able to investigate the causes of things, and discover the connection which exists between cause and effect; *here* we can only generalize facts themselves, and trace them up to general principles, without being able in any case to investigate the origin of those principles, or even discover how it is possible that anything should begin to be. Perhaps we shall be able to see with the clearness of certainty what we now can only render probable by a laborious train of reasoning, that everything which is possible *is*, and everything which is not is impossible at the present time.

One argument which renders this proposition probable is founded on the perfections of God. If we assume that, because God is omnipotent, He could have caused something to exist now which does not exist, it may be predicated of that thing that it is better it should exist than not exist, or worse that it should exist than not exist, or that its existence would be neither good nor evil. Now, the infinite goodness of God implies not only that all which He does is best, but that He will not omit to do anything which it would be better to do: and to say that God can not do anything contrary to his own infinite goodness, or contrary to his own will — which, from his nature and perfections, must be infinitely good — surely does not limit his omnipotence. It follows that if it is better that the thing should be than not to be, God, from his very perfections, must have willed to bring it into existence, or to lay a train of causes which would bring it into existence, at the very time when it would be best for it to exist. And as God is the author of all things which exist, either directly or indirectly, and as nothing can exist contrary to his will, it follows that it is in conformity with the will of God that whatever is now, should be now, and nothing else. Therefore, unless there is some flaw in this reasoning which I can not detect, it is true, at each moment of time, to say, Everything which is possible is; or, which is the same thing, Nothing is possible which is not. Nor is the truth of this proposition at all incompatible with the omnipotence of God; for the reason why nothing can be now but what is now exists in the perfections of God, and not in any hindering power out of God.

Thus it appears that all the transgressions of the law of God which take place are not only inevitable, but that they are inevit-

able because they are the best and only occurrences which could take place.

The objection which almost all would make to this conclusion is anticipated: Why praise men for some acts, and blame them for others, if they are both the very best possible? I answer that, as praise and blame rise spontaneously in every human mind, if these emotions are inconsistent with the above reasonings, the presumption against the reasoning would be very strong, if not conclusive. But there is, indeed, no inconsistency; for the same reasoning which proves whatever is is best at the present, proves that a change is best for the future,—and praise and blame are introduced to operate on the volitions of men, or as causes to produce new volitions and new actions. It does not follow that, because all the transgressions of the laws of God which occur are useful, therefore others which do not occur would be useful. On the contrary, the same reasoning which proves the former to be useful, proves that the latter would be injurious. God, therefore, has implanted in the human mind the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, and has caused praise to be agreeable to us, and blame disagreeable, that these emotions may be links in the great chain of cause and effect — to be the means of bringing into existence just such volitions as he foresees will be the best.

If it is replied that when men praise for good actions it is under the impression that the person praised could have done bad actions instead of good; and when they blame, it is under the impression that the person blamed could have avoided the action blamed; and that men themselves feel self-condemned for certain actions under the impression that they might have avoided them,— I answer, that these impressions do not prove the fact. If you examine men on this point, you will find that they have no distinct notions on the subject: most of them will say that they are free to do as they please, and this is the whole amount of their knowledge on the subject. Now, this is undoubtedly true. They are free to do as they please. If you ask them if they are free to do as they do not please, or if they are free to please contrary to the way they please, you will find that they have never thought on the subject; so that the real question, whether anything which a man does through his whole life could be avoided or not, has never entered their mind. How, then, can their impressions — or, as they sometimes call it, consciousness — decide the question?

If they examine the subject, so as to form any distinct notion of it, they will acknowledge that the action follows inevitably from the will or choice or volition; and that after a man pleases or wills to do a thing, the thing will be done, of course. If we will to move our arm, the arm moves: there is a necessary connection between the volition and the motion of the arm. To say that a man may move his arm or not, just as he pleases, is not deciding the question whether, if he does move his arm, he might have avoided that action. It is indeed plain that, after he willed to move it, it was no longer possible to avoid it.

It may be objected that, if men were taught to believe this doctrine, they would never blame themselves or others, because the sentiment of blame or sorrow for transgression could not spring up under the full belief that the transgression was unavoidable. I answer, that we never can become indifferent to pain under any system of instruction, or under any belief, as to the inevitability of actions. Pain will always be disagreeable to us, and the actions known to be productive of pain — as the transgression of the laws of God must be — will always be disapproved, unless we see clearly that they are intended for good.

It is true, that all which is bitter and resentful in blame will cease, but all which is instructive and amendatory will remain. When the one who is blamed perceives that there is nothing but kindness and instruction in the blame — no resentment nor vengeance, no relation to the past, but merely a desire to operate on the future — it will be more efficient in producing reformation than it has heretofore been; and, besides, the pain of resentful feelings, which has heretofore been very great, will be altogether avoided in the one who blames. The sum of human happiness will be vastly increased when men shall be educated up to a state of intelligence and virtue, in which they will clearly perceive that resentments are implanted in the human mind only to operate in the lowest states of ignorance, and that God uses them only as a scaffold to build up the temple of knowledge and virtue in the human mind — or rather to lay the foundation of this temple—and when this is done, the scaffold ought to be removed as cumbrous and unsightly. Some have thought that, because God has implanted resentment in the human mind, it was intended that this feeling should never become extinct — or, in other words, that what God creates He intends to be eternal; but we have no proof

of this: many races of animals have become extinct, and creation is in perpetual change. Man is born entirely ignorant, and his progress from one degree of knowledge and virtue to another is truly a new creation. Man is evidently not made perfect at once; he was, however, evidently made to *rise*, and not to *fall* — to advance towards perfection, and never to retrograde; and this great destiny he will fulfil. The motive of fear is useful in the lowest states of human intelligence and virtue; but as soon as higher motives can be implanted, fear ceases to operate, and the higher motives become much more efficient.

Even duty itself, which is thought by some to be the highest motive which can actuate the human mind, will become obsolete in the highest states of intelligence and virtue; for it is the nature of all the higher motives to render useless and inoperative those of inferior quality. Now, the highest of all possible motives to be good is the love of goodness itself. Take the exercise of any of the virtues, for example, and the truth of the assertion will be manifest. What is the highest motive to tell the truth, at all times, but the love of truth itself, and the pleasure we experience in telling the truth? When the love of truth is once firmly established in our minds, we never avoid lying from the fear of detection, nor do we tell the truth from a sense of duty any more than we eat a ripe peach from a sense of duty, and not from the pleasure of the taste.

The man who loves honesty does not avoid sheep-stealing from the fear of detection; he has no taste for the thing, and if he was sure he would never be detected, he would have no desire to do the act — the certainty of concealment would be no temptation; and if the idea of stealing never enters into his head in such a way as to induce him to deliberate a moment whether he will steal or not, it is manifest that he does not abstain from stealing through a sense of duty. Even those who maintain that duty is the highest motive would greatly prefer to have an affectionate wife rather than a dutiful one. Indeed, the moment I hear a woman praise herself for being a *dutiful* wife, I am sure she has not much domestic happiness in the conjugal state.

Love is a much higher and better motive, for two reasons: It is always at its post, ready to do its work — it never slumbers; but duty is not always present to the mind — it has to be called up by the mind, and sometimes will not come when called; thus it is

not so *efficient* as love. In the second place, duty does not afford so much *happiness* as love, even when it prompts us to perform the same actions; and that motive is undoubtedly the best which produces the highest enjoyment — especially if it is, at the same time, most efficacious in producing good volitions and virtuous actions. Indeed, the abstaining from vicious actions through the fear of punishment hardly deserves the name of virtue; and abstaining from any vice through a sense of duty has a less degree of virtue in it, than abstaining from the same vice through a hatred of the vice and a love of the opposite virtue.

It is an interesting thing to examine how many different motives may actuate the mind in the same line of conduct. For example, the study of science or literature: A youth may engage in this study from a desire to please his parents, and from this motive alone. Presently he may feel the spirit of emulation or a desire of fame springing up in his bosom; if this feeling becomes very strong, it will supplant the other entirely, and the first motives will be forgotten. Presently ambition may supplant emulation in the same way, and this being a stronger motive than either of the others when it takes deep root, it will stimulate the man to great exertions in the acquisition of knowledge.

But if the highest of all motives should spring up in the mind— the love of knowledge, and an unspeakable enjoyment in the discovery of truth — then all inferior motives, even ambition itself, will be forgotten as if they had never been; as there is no longer any use for them they may well cease to exist. They are, in fact, like resentment and anger, the mere scaffolding which God uses to build up the mind to a lofty state of excellence, and when this is accomplished the scaffolding is thrown down. I can conceive of no higher motive than the love of truth and the love of goodness. It is probable, therefore, that when this motive once takes root it will flourish to all eternity as the prevailing motive in all our conduct. And as our happiness will consist in the search and discovery of truth and in the practice of goodness, it will be impossible for the motive ever to change.

It may perhaps be objected by some, that, if anger and resentment should cease to spring up in our minds when we are injured and insulted, great evil would result, for no other motive would stimulate us to inflict that chastisement on the offender which his conduct deserves. Thus, he would never be cured of his evil, and

we would be subject to the continual repetition of the insult or injury. If this is really a true statement of the case, and if the evils here anticipated would really flow from the annihilation of anger and resentment, the objection is unanswerable, and would prove that God never intends these feelings to become extinct.

But are we sure that kindness and gentleness on our part towards the insolent would be less efficient in curing them of their insolent feelings towards us, and their disposition to do us injury, than conduct dictated by anger or resentment? So far from this being the case, it is as true in the moral world as in the material, that "action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions." Treat a man with harshness, and harshness will be returned—treat him with kindness, and kindness will be returned; at least, this is the case in the lower stages of his existence. As soon as a man rises high enough to perceive this law, why not take advantage of it? Why not treat the insolent with kindness, and thus "*overcome evil with good?*" Until a man is far advanced in knowledge and virtue he will not be able to act on this principle; but as soon as he can he will perceive it will be better both for him and the offender, because he himself will avoid the great pain of anger, and the offender will be more effectually cured. By the law of retaliation the offender might be restrained from insolent *conduct* in future, but by the law of kindness the very disposition or desire to be insolent would forever cease to exist. If even a few men should not only *act* kindly, but *feel* kindly, towards those who maltreat them and revile them, the beneficent effects of such conduct would be so apparent and so great that many would hasten to imitate so sublime an example, and an unspeakable amount of good would speedily be the result.

It is extremely hard, however, in the present state of society, for any to rise so high in their moral advancement as to act and feel thus, especially as they are educated during all the early part of their lives, when they are incapable of thinking for themselves, to believe in the law of retaliation, and when they see every one act on that principle and no one ever calls it in question. If children were taught from their earliest infancy, both by precept and by the example of their parents and all around them, that they must never return evil for evil, but to *bless them who curse them*, who can tell the mighty influence this system would have on the peace and happiness of the world in one generation?

But even in the present low state of moral advancement — low in comparison of what it will be in future times — the man who shall exhibit the sublime moral spectacle of kindness of feeling and gentleness of deportment towards one who treats him with insult and contumely, will produce a much more lasting and beneficial impression on all who witness the scene, than another who returns evil for evil.

The same mode of reasoning will apply, with peculiar propriety, to the conduct of a State towards a criminal. What would be more highly calculated to soften the heart of a criminal than to be treated with gentleness and kindness? If the State would never do anything to a criminal but what the most affectionate parent would wish to be done to his own child under similar circumstances, for the good of that child — provided that the parent's wishes were guided by sound reason,— an untold amount of evil in the prosecution of criminals would disappear from the earth. The time, I hope, is not far distant when every civilized nation will say in her criminal code to each of her offending children:

My dear child, I am extremely sorry for my past conduct in regard to you, my child; I ought to have provided the means of giving you a better education; your understanding ought to have been cultivated by the study of the arts and sciences, and your tastes so improved that you never would have thought of doing anything mean, low and base. I most humbly beg your pardon for having thus neglected you, more particularly as you might have enjoyed a great deal more happiness in the same time than you have done, and also been a much more useful man. Now, as the strongest proof I can give you of my sincere penitence for this my neglect, by which you have suffered a severe loss, I shall henceforth make every atonement in my power. In the first place, as you have, through my shameful negligence, advanced so far in life without being properly taught that you are now unwilling to learn, and would not even go to school if left entirely at your own disposal — and as your conduct proves beyond doubt that you can not be trusted to govern yourself until you are further taught, — I will enclose you in this my house of instruction, where you will be furnished with the best masters to instruct you in the arts and sciences; you shall take your choice, and if you are too old to acquire any taste for intellectual pursuits and enjoy-

ments, I shall be the more sorry for my negligence in not commencing your intellectual and moral education earlier. Notwithstanding, I will furnish you the means of learning a useful trade of your own choice, that you may be able to discover how much more happy you will be in future by making your living by your own industry than by the unjust means which, from mistaken views, you heretofore employed. You shall be treated with the greatest kindness while you stay under my roof, and whenever you are well taught you shall be at liberty to depart. So far from treating you with harshness and unkindness, my whole conduct to you shall prove that I blame myself and not you. I believe that, if a child is *brought up in the way he should go, when he is old he will not depart from it.* You were not so brought up; it is my fault, and why should I be angry at you? You were born in my family, without your knowledge or consent, and indeed without your agency in any way. Some of my children among whom you were born were rich and some poor, and many of them became so without any merit or demerit of their own. It was my duty, however, to see that none should starve either for want of bread or the want of knowledge, unless it was decidedly their own fault. Now, your want of instruction in childhood, when you did not know how to instruct yourself, is clearly my fault, and it ill becomes me to upbraid you for conduct which I, not you, could have anticipated from the neglect of your education at a time when you did not know how to educate yourself. I knew that ignorance would lead into error, and that error would terminate in crime: you knew nothing of this. I knew that, if you were brought up with a belief that you could benefit yourself by injuring another, this belief would lead to crime, yet I took no pains to teach you the falsity of this principle; nay, I permitted you to infer that I believed the principle to be true from my own conduct, for I frequently punished some of my own children with the avowed purpose of doing good to the rest, without the least regard to the good of those punished. For all this conduct I am utterly ashamed, and I promise in future never to do the like again. I begin with you; all I do to you, you shall feel, and others shall perceive, is done with the sole intention of making you a wiser and better man; and if I succeed in doing more good to others by this line of conduct than by the former — and if I also succeed in educating you up to so high a state of intelligence and virtue that you will no

longer have any desire to do anything base, — all my children will have occasion to rejoice at my new mode of discipline when one of them goes astray. I have foolishly acted, heretofore, as if the true interests of my children were not in harmony with each other; and when one of them acted on the same principle, and endeavored to benefit himself by violating the rights of another, I caught him and punished him without any regard to his happiness or well-being, with the avowed purpose of benefiting the others. This system I shall henceforth abandon, not merely from its injustice and incompetence to produce the desired effect, but because it is calculated to perpetuate the belief that we may sometimes benefit ourselves by doing evil to others — an error from which almost all crimes originate. Go, my son, into my house of correction, and be assured that you are deprived of your liberty only from necessity — a necessity which has arisen from my neglect to attend to your education in early life, and from the false doctrine which I myself contributed to inculcate into your youthful mind. Your transgression has arisen not so much from a desire to do evil to your brothers as from a desire to do good to yourself; as soon as you learn that your good can not be effected in this way, you may then be entrusted again with your liberty: consequently, it shall then most cheerfully be restored to you. In the meantime you shall be visited by the kindest and most benevolent of your brothers and sisters, who will sympathize with you, and be ready to take you by the hand and assist you, when you leave this my house of correction and education of those who err in their search for happiness — of those who *miss the mark*. During your hours of relaxation from study you may, if you choose, employ yourself in some useful and lucrative occupation; the proceeds, over and above the expenses of your education, shall be yours, and entirely at your own disposal when you shall be restored to liberty. If you should unfortunately refuse to accept of intellectual culture, though you have the choice of all departments of science and literature, with the best masters in each, then the only thing remaining is for you to learn some trade by which you may be able to support yourself, and become a useful member of society; and should you be so perverse and insensible to the claims of justice that you refuse even to do this, then you will be made to feel *want*, until you become willing to support yourself by the labor of your own hands. This necessity will be imposed upon you solely with a view to your

own good; for no one can be happy without being useful. Idleness is the bane of happiness, and industrious habits can only be acquired by the practice of some useful occupation. Practice, my son, and you will soon discover that a source of happiness never perceived before is within your reach, which, when once obtained, you will never abandon. I leave you now to your own choice. *Be wise and good, and you will be happy.*——

This is the language every State ought to address to her erring children. She is their mother, and she ought to feel towards them the kindest compassion when they deviate from the path of rectitude, because it is then they suffer the most pain. When a child has the colic, the fever and ague, or any corporeal disease, the mother watches over it with the most tender care, and all the medicines which she administers are intended to hasten its cure; none of them are expected to operate on what is past, but are intended entirely for the future. The medicines are not given for the good of the healthy children, but entirely for the good of the sick. Why should it not be so in moral diseases?

It is a curious circumstance, and one which I can not account for, that men in all ages, down to the nineteenth century, have acted in regard to punishments, and with regard to punishments alone, as if they could change the past. They seem to think that so much guilt deserves so much punishment, entirely independent of its tendency to produce reformation, or any beneficial effect on the sufferer.

When a man builds a house, it is not to live in during the preceding year, but the succeeding; and when he gives instruction to his child, it is not to make him wiser in time past, but in time to come. Now, if all punishment is only a kind of instruction, and is always unjust unless so intended, why should the idea of retrospective punishment ever enter our minds, any more than retrospective instruction. It is true, instruction may be better adapted to the state of the mind by knowing the preceding ignorance, and so may punishment by knowing the preceding crime. Medicine may be better adapted to the state of the patient by knowing the exact nature of the disease; but in all cases the intelligent agent in all his actions will aim to produce some effect *in future*, and never to change *the past*. God himself acts on this plan. In the series of events which take place in his universe, they are so arranged that the preceding one may produce the suc-

ceeding one, but never the reverse. Oh, vain man, how long will it be before thou learnest to act in conformity to the eternal and immutable order established in the universe of God!

Perhaps it may be urged, that though the rule is general that men's interests never clash, yet when a man has once committed a crime he has forfeited all right to be treated by his fellows according to the general rule; especially as he voluntarily committed the crime, knowing that if men caught him in the commission of it they would punish him, not with any regard to his good, but merely to set an example to others of what they would have to expect provided they did the same. And as a confirmation of this view it is urged, that the criminal himself acknowledges the justice of the punishment inflicted upon him — even the punishment of death. The first part of this argument would be unanswerable if it could be shown that it is for the good of society that a criminal should be punished *without* regard to his good, rather than *with* regard to his good; but this I think never can be shown,— and if not, the argument falls to the ground, and the acknowledgement of the criminal only proves how deeply implanted that most pernicious doctrine may be, that we may sometimes at least benefit ourselves by diminishing the well-being of others. In the days of persecution the minority acknowledged the right of the majority to burn at the stake. It was what they themselves intended to do as soon as they obtained power. In those days they seemed to think that belief in the doctrines of a creed did not depend upon the evidence of their truth, but upon the evidence that fire would burn; for that was all the evidence which the persecutors deigned to furnish. Had they been acquainted with the laws of the human mind, they would have known that, if they had furnished as conclusive and satisfactory proofs of the truth of their creed as they did that fire would burn, their belief in the one would have been as full and unwavering as their belief in the other. They would have known, also, that the evidence which they furnished that fire would burn, though it was perfectly convincing, would not in the least degree tend to convince either the one who was burned, or any of the spectators, that the articles of any particular creed were true which appeared to them to have no connection with the proposition "Fire will burn." It was the error of the age of persecution that unbelief could be destroyed by fire better than by argument: so it is the error of the present day to

believe that the public can be better secured from crimes by punishing criminals without regard to their good, than by considering their good *alone* in all the punishment which is inflicted upon them. They profess to act from the principle that it is proper and just and useful to the community that criminals should be punished without regard to their happiness, for the sake of example. If this is the true principle, and utility is really expected to the community from example, then do most communities act most preposterously to gain this end. If example is the thing to benefit the community, then ought punishments to be as public as possible. Men ought to be chained on the public highways and in the streets of our large cities, after they are convicted of crimes, that terror for evil deeds might meet us at every corner; and if this was not sufficient to deter others from the commission of crimes, then the severity of punishments ought to be increased. The criminals ought to be lashed on the bare back at stated intervals, and all the citizens should be invited to attend, that none of them might be deprived of the *salutary influence* which such example might have in deterring them from similar crimes. Care ought to be taken not to extend the punishment so far as to endanger the life of the patient, for the longer his life lasts and the more examples of torture he affords, the more beneficial does he become to the community.

Now how silly do men act, and how inconsistently with their own principles! Some criminals they catch and strangle within their prison-walls as quietly as possible, and will not let any one be present to derive advantage from this sublime spectacle, but the sheriff, the turnkey, and the clergyman; yet it is well known that men in general are but little affected with what they only hear, in comparison with what they see. Others they enclose within the walls of a penitentiary, and let no one see them but the person who takes them food and drink,—and not one in a thousand of the community ever thinks of them from the time they go in till the time they come out.

Men are beginning to act as if they were ashamed and afraid to let the community see their own laws executed, lest it might have a pernicious effect on their moral character. The very fact that men are beginning to execute capitally in private is a sure symptom that ere long the moral feelings of the community will obtain a glorious victory over that most pernicious error which it is my

chief object to combat in this paper. As soon as it is acknowledged that it is injurious for the multitude to be present at capital punishments, the very corner-stone on which the whole system of criminal jurisprudence is now built is removed, and the whole fabric must speedily tumble to the dust. If the community are not to be benefited by the spectacle of capital punishments, men will immediately begin to inquire what *use* there is in punishments. They will then soon come to the true conclusion that there is no utility in them only as they are beneficial to the criminal himself. They will then push their inquiries a little further, and they will soon conclude that the best way to improve the criminal is to strengthen his understanding, to elevate his tastes, and to teach him the laws of God, and especially *that* law in which it is enacted that no man can benefit himself by doing evil to another.

Oh glorious day for mankind when this becomes the universal sentiment! All malice and strife will cease, and man will learn war no more. Even that universal maxim, that "the best way to preserve peace is to be prepared for war," will be abandoned as a dangerous principle; for even the act of preparing for war is calculated to excite the jealousies and ill will of surrounding nations, and the expense of keeping large standing armies is like a millstone hung round the neck of society to retard their advancement in the arts and sciences. When wars cease, men will rapidly advance in all that adorns life and makes it desirable. How much more rapidly would they advance if all *thought* of wars was for ever removed from the mind! When rumors of war are spread abroad, and preparations for war are commenced, the all-absorbing subject of war takes possession of the mind, and no time is left for cultivating the arts of peace, and the evils to society are almost as great as when the chariot of actual war is fiercely driven over the land. A thousand vices will disappear from the earth when the war-spirit becomes extinct, and a thousand virtues will spring up in their stead. As soon as all nations shall clearly perceive that no two of them can carry on a war without great loss to themselves and to all other nations, all motive to war will cease, and men will learn to "do unto others as they would have others do unto them." Industry will then be directed in the right channels. Iron will not be dug out of the bowels of the earth to be melted into cannon balls, and then thrown into the ocean at great expense of saltpetre, sulphur and charcoal. The immense labor heretofore

employed in surrounding cities with walls and ditches and forts, occupying so much ground which might be usefully employed in agriculture, will then be spared to increase the wealth and comforts of mankind, and to leave abundance of time to cultivate the mind by reading and study, after all necessary comforts and conveniences of life are procured by half the quantity of labor which men are now obliged to undergo to obtain a scanty and precarious subsistence.

The external comforts which would arise from correct views on these important points would form a very small portion of the whole amount of the increase of happiness which would be immediately experienced. It is in the mind of man properly cultivated that his chief happiness dwells. It is the mind, also, which suffers the most poignant anguish, frequently, under false views. What a fountain of joy, springing up to eternal happiness, will be laid open to our view as soon as we can see with the clearness of demonstration that every thing which occurs, even the most distressing, is ordered by infinite power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and infinite goodness; and that the greatest evils which occur will tend not merely to increase the happiness of the whole universe, but especially of the individual on whom the evils fall. Unbounded and confiding love of God would then fill our souls, terror and despair would be forever banished from our minds, even when the clouds of adversity shrouded our horizon in their darkest hue. It would be eternally present to our minds that the justice of God required pain to be the consequence of transgression no more than his most tender mercy; and that it would be cruel, as well as unjust, to withhold that pain from the transgressor which alone could teach him not to transgress in a similar way again. As soon as we shall see that the infinite holiness of God does not require Him to punish transgression of his laws with infinite and eternal punishment, but rather to cause that pain to follow transgression which will tend to prevent transgression in future, our minds will be freed from all superstitious dread of almighty vengeance, which is as fatal to growth in virtue as to the increase of happiness.

To punish the transgressor with infinite and eternal punishment for transgressions, without intending to produce the destruction of sin, would indicate rather an infinite love of punishment than an infinite hatred of sin; and the best and only way to manifest an infinite hatred of sin is to take the best means to root it out of ex-

istence. And it would appear, so far as we can see, that this can only be done by the plan God has certainly adopted: to cause pain always to follow transgression and happiness always to follow obedience, and then to give man the power to discover that effects flow from causes.

Perhaps it may be objected, that God does not intend that the pain which follows transgression should work out the reformation of the transgressor, as it manifestly sometimes does not produce that effect. On the contrary, men sometimes seem to get worse and worse the more they transgress and the more they suffer for the transgression. For example, the drunkard: so far from being cured by the headache consequent on a debauch, so far from abhorring the liquor which he knows by experience stultifies all his mental powers, and renders him unfit for a time to enjoy the high pleasures of the understanding and the unspeakable joys of domestic affection, he seeks with increased ardor the delirium of intoxication, knowing at the same time that his conduct is hastening him down to a premature and disgraceful death, and agonizing the feelings of all who love him most. Indeed, so far from drunkenness curing itself by the frightful consequences which God has made to follow in its train, it seems to render its victims regardless of all consequences, and even to invert the nature of man so far as to cause him to choose misery in preference to happiness, and that, too, at the expense of making those wretched who are united to him by the dearest ties of consanguinity and affinity. Now, it may be said that as God does not cure the drunkard by the pain which He causes to follow drunkenness, He does not cause the pain with the intention of curing; for He can not be frustrated in his intentions.

To all this it may be answered, that though the pain of drunkenness does not always prevent future intoxication, yet this pain may have its utility. We are not sure but that the man who even kills himself by continued drunkenness may die with a more thorough hatred of drunkenness than one who has never been drunk. He knows its evils by sad experience. If it is asked, Why, then, did he not abandon the practice? the answer may perhaps be, that a state of disease was produced by the habit of intoxication which so affected the body that nothing short of death could cure it, and yet the disembodied spirit may depart to the other world with the utmost loathing of all intemperance — a

loathing increased by having experienced the effects of intemperance here.

It would be illogical to infer that, because God does not always cure a disease by the pain which arises from that disease whilst the patient is in this world, therefore God never intends to cure the disease. God is constantly using means to overcome ignorance — his whole universe is one great system of instruction ; yet He advances but a very small distance in producing perfect wisdom, even in the brightest intelligences, whilst they are in this world : and yet it would be manifestly absurd to infer that God will not succeed in making us extremely wise in millions of years after our departure from this world. Now it may be that the disease of the *body* produced by repeated intoxication is incurable, yet the soul may awake from its stupor in the world of spirits with a hatred of all intemperance and an inexpressible joy at finding itself freed from the miserable clog of clay, which it now perceives was the only impediment which hindered it at once from rising into the pure regions of intelligence and bliss.

But even if the case of the drunkard, and perhaps some others, can not be explained in accordance with the doctrine advanced in this paper, the general principle may still be true, that the pain which God has caused to follow transgression is intended to lead to reformation. Besides, who can tell how many are prevented from becoming confirmed drunkards by considering the horrible state to which they and their families would be reduced if they yielded to the temptation of continued intoxication ?

It appears, then, highly probable that in this case, as in all others, the tendency of the pain consequent upon transgression is to produce reformation in all minds possessing sufficient reason to discover that pain is the result of the transgression ; and therefore we may safely infer that God designed this tendency when he arranged it so that pain should follow transgression. Nay, further, God does not always wait till the commission of the overt act of transgression before He commences the punishment. He has beautifully and wisely and mercifully arranged it so that the punishment is cotemporaneous with the first thought of committing the transgression, even before the design is formed or the plan laid. The punishment begins thus early evidently with the design to prevent the overt act, and sometimes even the completion of the design to commit the overt act.

What an untold amount of crime is prevented by this most benevolent arrangement! How much suffering is avoided by using an ounce of prevention instead of a pound of cure! How much more beautiful is such a plan as this, and how much more efficient in advancing the moral education of rational beings, than any plan which would defer the punishment for a long time after the commission of the transgression! If God had caused happiness to be the result of transgression of his laws in this world and misery in the next, such an arrangement would seem like a plan to entrap us into crime, for all our experience would then lead us to believe that crimes are true means of happiness. Such a scheme was never made by a wise and benevolent God.

Perhaps it may be objected to the system which I have here presented, that it represents God as acting inconsistently with his own plans and determinations. In a former part of this paper, it may be said I endeavored to prove that God designed that man should commit moral evil, and in the latter part I have endeavored to show that God has made the best possible contrivances to prevent moral evil, and to cure that which is not prevented. To this objection I answer: that God did certainly intend, as was demonstrated before, all the moral evil which exists, and no more, and the contrivances which He has made to prevent moral evil are intended not to prevent that which takes place, but that which would take place without these contrivances. God, in his infinite wisdom, sees that the ignorance of man would lead him eternally astray from the path of rectitude, if He did not hedge in this path with thorns and thistles, which, by their pungent stings, would warn the traveller, at every deviation, that he must immediately return.

It may be objected, also, that the system here advocated places the revealed will of God in his Word in contradiction to his secret will in his decrees; that his revealed will is that man should commit no transgressions, but that his secret will is that he should commit all the transgressions which he does commit. To this objection I answer: that there is no contradiction between the revealed and secret will of God. The Word of God is a revelation of his laws, and not at all a revelation of his will that those laws shall not be broken. If God willed that his laws should not be broken, they never would be broken; for what God wills must come

to pass. His written Word is only a different form of instructing his rational creatures what to do and what not to do to secure their highest happiness. It comes in aid of their experience as to the effects of actions on their happiness or misery. It is kind advice given by a most affectionate father: Do this, and be happy — avoid that, or be miserable. It nowhere says that God's will or determination is that we shall not disobey. This advice, like the pain we experience from transgression, or even from the thought of transgression, is intended not to hinder us from the transgressions which we actually commit, but from those we would commit without the aid of this advice. God has determined that we shall commit no more transgressions than we actually do commit, and He has taken effectual means to insure that result. I think, also, we may safely conclude, from the means which we see in operation, that it is his determination that we shall commit fewer and fewer transgressions the longer we live, until finally, when we become perfectly wise, transgression will become impossible. In this process our free agency will all the time remain unimpaired. Our liability to sin will evidently diminish with the increase of our wisdom and goodness, whilst our free agency will constantly remain the same. Nor is it necessary that man should become infinitely wise to render transgression in him impossible; it is enough that his wisdom be coëxtensive with his sphere of action, so that nothing should be presented to his mind leading to action beyond his sphere of knowledge. Now, as man's sphere of action is limited, we may well conceive that his knowledge, which is constantly increasing in this world, and will probably increase much faster in the next, will become so extensive in millions of years that no proposition could then be proposed to him which he could not determine as to its evil or good consequences; and as God never will, to all eternity, cause happiness to be the result of the transgression of his laws, this knowledge is all that is necessary to render transgression impossible — especially when we consider that man never can have his nature so changed that he can prefer misery to happiness; and to prefer the known causes of misery to the known causes of happiness would be the same as preferring the misery itself.

Perhaps it may be objected that I have based all my reasonings, in this paper, on the supposition that man is a purely intellectual

being, and that all his volitions arise from the dictates of the understanding, whereas it is manifest that he is not purely intellectual, and that very many of his volitions are chiefly influenced by his passions, and still more by his habits — and that, too, so suddenly that his rational powers have no time to act before the volition is made; and hence it is inferred that man may still be liable to transgress the law of God, even after he becomes perfect in knowledge, if that time should ever arrive. This objection, however plausible, is easily answered. I acknowledge that many of our volitions are influenced by our passions, and many depend on our habits, as completely as the volitions of beasts depend on instinct; and I have no doubt that we are formed by the Creator with the capacity of acquiring habits, and being influenced by them, for the wisest purposes. Without such a capacity man would be in many respects inferior to the beasts, and, indeed, would be altogether unfitted for an inhabitant of this world. But habits themselves may be examined by reason, and approved or condemned as they shall appear useful or injurious to our happiness; and there is no bad habit, however confirmed by long use, that can not be corrected by long continued and repeated efforts. I will not say that the converse of this proposition is true: that good habits, when once confirmed by long use, can be changed to bad; for good habits, when examined by reason, will be approved, and, of course, no efforts will be made to change them. Thus they will remain forever as parts of our very self, eternally ready to lead us to make proper volitions on all subjects within the sphere of their influence. Hence, it is manifestly true, if you *bring up a child in the way he should go, when he is old he will not depart from it.* But Solomon nowhere says, Bring up a child in the way he should *not* go, and when he is old he will not depart from it.

All nature is a great system of education, and we are constantly reminded by some pain or inconvenience, every time we deviate from the path of rectitude and virtue, to examine the cause of this pain, and to try to find a remedy and the means of avoiding it in future. If it originates from a bad habit, we see it is our interest to begin immediately to correct that habit; and, knowing that bad habits of long standing can only be overcome by long-continued efforts, and a firm determination to succeed, we do not despair of obtaining a victory in the end, though our first

efforts may appear to be unattended with success. It is acknowledged, then, that many of our volitions are under the influence of habit, and not decided by reason at the moment; yet, as the habits themselves are subject to reason, to change or modify them according to the dictates of the understanding, it seems that we may safely draw the conclusion on this point which we drew before, that when we become perfect in knowledge we will be able to see clearly any bad habit which we may have acquired, and know how to overcome it in the shortest possible time — and when that is effected, transgression will be impossible.

Many of our volitions also arise from our passions, or at least are very much influenced by them; and as our passions are blind instincts, and altogether incapable of deciding at all times how far it will be to our true interest to indulge them, it is inferred on this ground, that transgressions may continue from the impulse of passion long after we become perfectly wise. But neither is this a correct conclusion; for it is one of the principal prerogatives of reason to guide the impulses of passion, and say to each, *Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther.* And we know by experience that many men, even in this early period of existence, when passion is strong and reason is weak, so restrain their passions that but little evil arises from their indulgence; we may then, I think, safely infer that the time will come when the passions will become the servants and not the masters of reason. This conclusion appears to be the more unexceptionable when we consider, what is known to be the fact, that superstition, in some of its vagaries — taking it for granted that the indulgence of some of our strongest passions was sinful — has been able, not indeed to extirpate the passion, but to grant it no indulgence; if, then, superstition has been able, fighting against nature, to produce such an unexpected result to the great injury of the individual, shall we deny to Omnipotent Reason, acting in harmony with nature, the power of so directing the impulses of passion as to result in good and only good continually?

Some seem to think that man, in his present imperfect state, could avoid transgressing the law of God altogether; but this is manifestly impossible, for many of the laws of God are unknown to the brightest intellects till the day of their death; and when we begin to act in infancy all of his laws are unknown to us — even the law of gravitation has to be learned by many a painful thump.

Nor does it impeach the mercy or goodness of God to command us not to transgress, and to punish us or give us pain when we do transgress; for these commands and the pains resulting from transgression are intended as a system of instruction, to enable us finally to know and obey all his laws. They are evidently not intended to make us perfectly wise in an instant, for they do not produce that effect, and, so far as we can see, it is impossible they should; and if they can not make us perfectly wise in an instant, they can not in an instant place us in a situation to keep all the laws of God.

Everything great and good which God creates is done in a gradual manner, and we know of nothing greater than the mind of man but the Creator himself. The oak is increasing for centuries in majesty and strength. The earth has required thousands of centuries to attain its present state of comfort and convenience for man, and man will be increasing in knowledge and excellence when millions of ages have rolled away. Whether he will continue to transgress and suffer after death we have no means of knowing; the probability is, from the mere principles of reason, that man will continue to transgress as long as he is ignorant, and that he will continue to suffer as long as he transgresses. It is, however, quite plain that the whole amount of suffering from transgression will be a mere infinitesimal when compared with the amount of enjoyment which will arise from obedience. For we can see clearly, that even in this world it will be so as soon as the principles contained in this paper are universally believed and acted upon, both by governments and individuals — and this will certainly be the case at no very distant day. Whenever, in the providence of God, the world arrives at a state in which any one can conceive and clearly demonstrate the means of improving the condition of man, the public opinion will soon rise to a point where it will be possible to put those means into operation. Men are beginning to see that wars are always injurious, not merely to the belligerents, but to the whole world; they are beginning to doubt the propriety of punishing capitally before the assembled multitude. The next step, and one, too, which must be taken when men have advanced thus far, will be to abandon forever the law of force for the *law of kindness;* and when the law of kindness is once adopted, it will never be abandoned. Men are made to advance, and not to retro-

grade: they are made to rise, and not to fall. The nature of the human mind leads to this conclusion, and the history of the world establishes the fact.

After all, it may be said by some that, in the present state of the world, it would lead to licentiousness to teach the multitude the doctrines contained and advocated in this paper, and if so, it forms a strong presumption against the truth of the doctrine itself, for truth must always be beneficial to mankind. I acknowledge that all who have been brought up in the doctrines which have heretofore prevailed on the nature of moral accountability and punishment would immediately infer that men ought neither to be blamed nor punished for any violation of God's law, if it is better for them and all mankind that they should commit the very transgression which they did commit, and especially if it is God's will that they should commit it; on the contrary, they infer that men ought to be as well pleased with others and with themselves, when they commit murders and thefts, as when they perform the most benevolent and disinterested acts of charity. And they insist that, whether this is a just conclusion from the premises or not, as it is one which would be drawn, it is proof conclusive that the doctrine ought not to be taught. Now, I answer, that there is no doubt that "truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," is better for man than falsehood or error, and the nearer we approximate to the truth on any subject the better. And if it could be shown that the doctrines of this essay lead to licentiousness, when properly understood, it would be conclusive proof against their truth.

It will not do to show that *false* deductions from the doctrines will lead to licentiousness: this would rather prove the doctrines to be true. To what dreadful evils have false deductions from Christianity led! False deductions from false principles may lead to good, but false deductions from true principles can lead only to evil. But the conclusion that men ought not to be punished for their transgressions is not false, and will not lead to evil, but to the greatest good; it will free men from the absurdity of endeavoring by punishment to change the past, instead of directing a steady eye to the future; and, as was said before, it will prevent men from punishing from a principle of vengeance. But it is an absolute *non sequitur* to say that we ought to be as well pleased with ourselves when we transgress the law of God as

when we obey; because it would be the same as saying we ought to be as fond of pain as we are of pleasure, which would be the same as saying we ought to change our natures, and not to be what we are. There is no philosophy which can ever have the slightest tendency to make us fond of pain and averse to happiness, and, of course, it will always be impossible for us to look with pleasure on the transgression of God's law, knowing, at the same time, that transgression will always be followed with pain; yet even here much anguish may be avoided by correct views. The only use of repentance and sorrow for transgression is to produce reformation: if that can be effected without the pain of sorrow, so much the better. Now, true philosophy ought to teach us to rejoice whenever we have discovered the cause of any evil produced by a transgression of the law of God, so that we may avoid the evil in future. It is in vain to sit down and weep over what can not be changed; we ought to save our strength for future action. Why may not the time arrive when we will be truly grateful to any one who will clearly demonstrate to us that we are wrong, either in our reasoning or in our conduct? Such a one would undoubtedly be our benefactor, and therefore would deserve our gratitude.

Again, the doctrines here taught never will be received as true by those who think they lead to licentiousness, and therefore they will not operate injuriously on their minds, except it be to raise a spirit of persecution against the advocates of them. The abolishment of the present Criminal Code, and the establishment of a new one founded on true principles, will never take place until the great body of the people are enlightened enough to see that the present system leads to the production of the crimes which it is intended to prevent. As long as the community shall believe that the fear of punishment is the most effectual preventative of crime the present system will be continued, and perhaps it is better it should. Fear is, no doubt, implanted in the human mind for wise purposes, and in the low stages of our existence it may be used as a motive; but the sooner it can be supplanted by higher motives the better; and as soon as it is supplanted it will become useless and obsolete. Whether the time will ever come when the motive of fear will be entirely abandoned, both by parents in the education of their children and by States in the correction of criminals, it is not for us to say. Certain it is, that the principle of

fear is less used by parents and States in proportion as they are more enlightened.

Perhaps it may be thought unsatisfactory to deduce from the perfections of the Deity only, and not from experience and an examination of facts, the great principle which lies at the foundation of the system advocated above, namely, *the true interests of mankind never clash*. As it relates to the present life, where we have experience of the causes of happiness and misery, the objection is worthy of consideration; as to the life to come, we have no means of knowing by experience, either that there will be a continuance of our conscious existence after death, or that we will be happy. Once, however, establish that there is a God of infinite power, wisdom and goodness, then, if we grant that it will be better for us to exist happy to all eternity than to be annihilated at death, it will follow, without a doubt, that we will so exist; for whatever is better to be done, a God of infinite perfections will inevitably do, as was before demonstrated.

If, indeed, it could be shown that conscious existence is impossible to us while united to our material bodies, then, however desirable it might appear to exist happy after death, it would imply no absurdity to say that a God of infinite perfections could not confer on us a happy immortality; but no such impossibility can be shown or even rendered probable.

If this life comprises the whole of human existence, then, so far as man is concerned, this whole world is a complete failure, at which every rational creature would incline to hiss with scorn, rather than exult. I am now sixty years old, and during the whole course of my life I have been placed in circumstances calculated to produce as large a sum of happiness as falls to the lot of the most favored individuals. In my childhood and youth poor, humble and obscure, stimulated with a strong desire of knowledge and endowed with a mind capable of acquiring it, I gradually advanced from one degree of knowledge to another, until finally I was enabled to unfold mysteries in meteorology which had been hidden from every previous examiner. The curtain of the great theatre of the atmosphere was drawn up, and I was admitted behind the scenes, into the very council chamber of the Creator, when not only the *modus operandi* in producing storms, but the final causes of many most beautiful contrivances, were laid open to my delighted view. I have lived to see these

discoveries acknowledged by the scientific world, and in some degree appreciated; and during the progress of these discoveries and this appreciation, I have derived from them no ordinary degree of happiness: yet I do not hesitate to declare that if, in the midst of my most exalted emotions of pleasure, I had been convinced that there is no God to whom all these beautiful contrivances could be referred, and that this life terminates the conscious existence of man, I should have felt at the same moment that the cup of happiness was torn from my lips and dashed to the ground. What! wakened into existence, and educated for a few short years, to know the unspeakable value of an immortality of happiness, merely to be told that this immortality shall not be mine! It is a mockery which can only exist on supposition that there is no God, and that things begin to exist without cause and without object. What! bring a being into existence without knowledge, but with the capacity of acquiring knowledge and improving indefinitely — educate him up (for all nature is a system of education) to a state in which he begins to know how to live and how to enjoy, and then strike him out of existence! It is an improbability which could not result from blind chance once in a million of times, even if chance were an agent; and *never* from a Benevolent Intelligence. Much less could a Benevolent Intelligence bring into existence a being capable of increasing in knowledge and virtue for a few years, and then place him in a situation where no increase of knowledge would be of any use to him, and where his sensibility would be preserved only to render him capable of suffering unmingled pain without end, and where he could not even have the mournful consolation of putting an end to his torments by terminating his existence. To some minds, the horrible injustice and cruelty of such a proceeding would be heightened if the tormenter had arranged his plans from all eternity to create the being thus to be tormented with just such dispositions and such a degree of defective knowledge as would, when placed in certain circumstances determined on, inevitably lead to the violations of the laws for which he was afterwards to be punished to all eternity, without any intention of benefiting him by the punishment. Indeed, so revolting is the latter notion to some minds, who nevertheless think it is necessary to believe in a hell of never-ending torment, they have adopted the following system, which seems to them to relieve the Deity from the odium of being the tormenter himself:

They suppose that "God could not create man without endowing him with free will, and that in consequence of this free will, man might so change his nature, which was originally created capable of deriving happiness from goodness alone, as to derive the only pleasure he should then be capable of enjoying from wickedness, or doing evil to others — that this nature will remain depraved to all eternity, and thus he will be prompted to do evil to others, in order to procure for himself the only pleasure his nature is capable of receiving, and that God is constantly restraining him from doing evil, as much as is consistent with his free will."

How He restrains beings from evil, when at the same time the nature of these beings is such, that the only pleasure which they enjoy is from the mischief or evil which they do to others, is not explained: nor is any attempt made to show that God is not the author of all this evil; as He certainly is, as it arises out of the circumstances in which man was placed, whether he was originally created with a nature capable of deriving pleasure only from vice, or whether that nature was acquired after his creation. God, then, by this system, is not freed from the odium of punishing a portion of his intelligent creatures with eternal punishment, without any intention of benefiting them; and besides, He is inadvertently accused of having formed men so that a portion of them would be stimulated to all eternity by the strongest motives which we can conceive of, to heap new torments on each other. Such a system, we may safely say, could not be devised by an infinitely good God, and therefore it does not exist. As it relates to this present life, however, it is proper to inquire, not merely what nature man *ought* to have, consistent with the infinite perfections of the Contriver, but what nature, in point of fact, he *has*, so far as we can ascertain by the most careful observation.

Now if any one will turn his attention inwards, he will discover that our chief happiness consists in our benevolent affections, in our emotions of kindness and good-will towards others, and in the consciousness that the manifestation of these kind emotions gives pleasure to those we associate with. Indeed, our love of others is a source of much greater happiness to us than our love of ourselves; for even in our solitary moments it is a source of unspeakable joy to reflect that our kind offices are received and returned with kindness by those we love, and that their happiness is thus increased through our instrumentality. Now these kind

affections, more or less strong, are implanted in every human breast. They are always at their posts, frequently not less active in the illiterate than in those whose intellects are highly cultivated, and they never let us rest satisfied without *doing* good ; their very object is the happiness of others. Yet our own happiness exists in the very exercise of kind feelings ; and if self-love and social are not identically the same, our own happiness and that of others is promoted by the self-same means. Nothing could be more admirably contrived for the production of happiness to the whole system than this arrangement.

Again, when we turn our attention to the intellectual part of our nature, and consider the joys attending the pursuit and discovery of truth, though it appears that we are stimulated to exertion in this field chiefly by the pleasure we ourselves experience in the exercise of the intellectual powers, which seems of a more selfish character than the exercise of our benevolent affections, yet it is so arranged that the result of our investigations is for the good of mankind ; for every truth that we discover is connected with some good, which could be procured for the benefit of all only by the discovery of the truth.

When we reflect on this arrangement, we can not help admiring the goodness and wisdom of the Creator in thus causing our selfish pursuit of truth to result in the universal good of mankind, while at the same time our individual happiness is secured — first, by giving us a high relish for intellectual pursuits, and second, by gratifying our benevolent affections, when we reflect that our labors are beneficial to mankind.

Again, by pushing our inquiries still further, we will discover that there are no ingredients infused into our constitutions whose object is to produce unhappiness. We have no principle of malevolence or ill-will towards the human race. It is true, we sometimes feel angry at a particular individual ; but this passion is always excited by some real or supposed ill-will or injustice on the part of the individual towards us, and the paroxysm is generally of short duration, and while it lasts is generally quite as painful to the one who feels the passion as to the one against whom it is directed. Besides, there is a general tendency in nature to abolish the causes of anger and resentment by educating us up to see that the object of anger and resentment, the correction of the offender, may be much better effected by kindness

and gentleness than by harshness and violence. As to revenge, there is seldom such a feeling arising in the human breast, and never except when a person imagines he has been treated with the greatest injustice or insult. This feeling will never be excited, and, of course, become extinct, when men shall treat each other with undeviating kindness and justice. Indeed, before that period shall arrive, much that tends to excite anger and resentment would be done away, if children should be taught from their earliest infancy to look on their fellows as possessing noble and exalted natures, loving justice and kindness, and invariably disposed to be kind to those that are kind to them; that God is never angry with them, but looks with tender compassion when they mistake the means of procuring happiness: and if, added to this, they should never see their parents angry at each other or with them, but, overcoming all their waywardness and disobedience by kindness and gentleness, who can say how much the happiness of the world would be increased in a single generation! The pain of anger on one side, and the resentment and sense of injustice and tyranny on the other, would be avoided, and the worst of all motives to action, *fear*, would never be introduced into the mind of the child. The most perfect confidence would thus be established on both sides, and there being no temptation to deceive from the fear of punishment, which is the great fountain of untruthfulness, if the child should never be deceived himself, it is probable, under these benign influences, he would seldom or never deviate from the strictest truth.

In early youth, "thought is speech and speech is truth;" and so it would continue if the true system of education were universally adopted. Under the system which is now prevalent, children are frequently placed in circumstances where they think it is necessary to tell a falsehood to avoid a greater evil, as they suppose; that is, their fear of punishment is greater than their fear of lying. Indeed, in some cases the cruelty of parents seems almost to justify the deception which is practiced upon them by their children. Were a madman to meet us on the edge of a precipice from which we had no means of escaping, and with drawn sword order us to jump down or he would run us through, we would feel ourselves justified in saying to him: "Oh! any one can easily jump down, but we will do something much more wonderful — let us go down and we will jump up!" A child is some-

times as much terrified at the threats of a parent as we would be in the situation above.

The great evil of this system is, that the child discovers he can frequently benefit himself by lying, which he is taught to believe wrong — and it is quite natural that, after he experiences benefit from *one* wrong, he should draw the inference that *another* might benefit him also. Thus he is gradually led to believe that the interests of all mankind are not the same, but that he may sometimes benefit himself by diminishing the well-being of others — *that fatal error from which all crimes spring.* There is one fact highly consolatory on this subject. This highly pernicious error, even when it becomes the most deeply rooted, never destroys our benevolence; hence, when we do evil to others for the sake of promoting our own happiness, our benevolent feelings are always wounded. This is the regenerating principle; for as the benevolent feelings are part of ourselves, and as the error in question is only *acquired* by a false education, the *false* must finally yield to the *true*, after a long course of painful experiments.

It was said above, that no ingredients or principles are infused into our constitutions whose object is to produce unhappiness, and yet it can not be denied that we are placed in circumstances which operate on our nature in such a manner as to produce inevitably errors of judgment and errors of conduct, which cause a lamentable amount of human misery.

Some have thought that a strong argument to prove a future state of existence may be drawn from the fact that the best men suffer a great deal of misery in this life which they do not deserve, and they infer that a just God is bound to remunerate them for all this suffering in a life to come. I confess the argument appears, to my mind, much stronger when drawn from the sufferings of the worst men. The best men experience much more happiness, and suffer much less misery, than the worst, and would have much less reason to complain of injustice in the Creator if they were struck out of existence at death, than the worst men, whose sufferings are tenfold greater; and as all their wickedness and suffering formed a part of the great plan of the universe, it seems certain, if those who suffered least have a right to expect a continuation of existence after death and remuneration for their suffering here — *à fortiori*, those who have suffered most have a right to expect the same remuneration.

This conclusion so manifestly follows, on the supposition that God is omniscient, that it needs only to be stated to be seen ; and even on the supposition that the evils which arise in the workings of the system which God has introduced were unexpected, still the same conclusion is true, for if any unexpected evil arises to a being whom God brought into existence, whether it comes upon him with or without the consent of his will, justice requires that he should be remunerated, if his Creator has it in his power to grant the remuneration.

Some have thought that the justice of God could not be impeached, provided every being which He brings into existence has such a balance of happiness over misery as would induce him to prefer existence to non-existence. But the justice of the Deity is not to be decided by the preference of the individual for existence : the question is, Could the Deity cause him to enjoy more happiness in a given time, or could He, by continuing the system forever, cause it so to work as to produce to every one an amount of happiness greater than all the misery which it is necessary he should experience in the early stages of his existence ? If this is possible, the goodness and justice of the Deity render it certain that it will be.

Perhaps it may be thought that the mode of reasoning adopted here proves too much, and therefore is not correct. In point of fact it may be said, that millions of the human family are manifestly not placed in the best possible situations for the enjoyment of happiness. They are born into a world where the soil is preoccupied, from which alone they are to procure their bread. Spinning jennies and steam-engines are invented and in the hands of the wealthy, which renders it impossible to procure the means of support with their hands, the only machines furnished them by nature. The cravings of hunger compel them to employ their time in that most painful and degrading labor, begging, without the pleasure of adding anything to the common stock of wealth. They are deprived of almost all the pleasures of intellectual culture, and the joy of contributing in a high degree to the happiness of others ; and as the sexual pleasure is the only one within their reach, it would appear that the care of Providence is much more directed towards the production of human beings than towards their happiness after they are produced.

Nor are the rich placed in the most favorable circumstances for

the enjoyment of happiness. The temptations which accompany wealth are harder to resist than those which attend poverty. Prosperity is harder to bear with equanimity than adversity; and it may be safely said that a good education and poverty are the best patrimony that ever was left by a parent to his child. When a child is brought up with the knowledge that he is born to the inheritance of wealth, it frequently happens that he has not stimulus enough to exertion, which is necessary for the health both of body and mind. He is more likely to grow up proud, and overbearing, and irritable, in consequence of his want of constant occupation — feelings that stand in the way of happiness. Thus it may be said, that if the object of the Deity is to produce as much happiness as possible, He is as much bound to prevent men from being too rich as from being too poor. But neither is this objection well founded, for it is directed not against any principles essential to human nature, which were before examined and found to be all good, but against the state of society as at present existing. Now, all the evils of the present state of society have arisen out of ignorance, and ignorance was shown before to be unavoidable. As soon as society becomes wise enough to see that it will be as much to the interest of the rich as of the poor that provision shall be made for every child that is born, that he be well educated and provided with employment after he grows up, sufficient to free him from all fear of want, provided he uses a moderate degree of industry, the evils here complained of will cease: and it would be as unreasonable to suppose that God could educate society up to this state of knowledge in a minute, as that He could create an earth in the same time. It is sufficient to "justify the ways of God to man" to show that He is using the most effectual means to bring about this most desirable end.

If there is any value in creation at all (and that there is who can doubt?), it would seem, as far as we can judge, that it would have been better for God to have created the earth millions of years sooner than He did, so that sensitive beings might have been enjoying happiness all this time, and thus it would seem that there would be a great deal more happiness in the universe than there is. Now, the only inference which can be drawn from the perfections of God on this subject is, that it was impossible for the world to have been created sooner, otherwise God has not done all the good which he could, and consequently is not, on this supposition, infi-

nitely good; a conclusion that can not be admitted, unless it is first shown that the universe could have been created sooner; but this never can be shown. Certainly the earth was being created millions of years before it became a fit habitation for man; and even yet it is becoming more and more comfortable every day for those who are brought into existence upon it. Thus if we who are brought into existence *now*, have not enjoyed happiness as long as those who lived first on the earth, preparations have been made for us to enjoy more happiness in a given time than they did. Not only is the physical world better prepared for our reception, but the moral and intellectual; for every truth which has been discovered tends to increase the enjoyments of men; and Moral Philosophy itself, however high-sounding its name, is but the science of *living well*. It is in no respects superior to Physical Science, unless it contributes more to human happiness.

THE HUMAN WILL.

[*Extracts from the work of* Albert Taylor Bledsoe, *on the Will.*]

"This, then, is the true idea of a free agent: it is one who, in view of circumstances, both external and internal, can act without being efficiently caused to do so. This is the idea of a free agent which God has realized by the creation of the soul of man. It may be a mystery; but it is not a contradiction. It may be a mystery; but it solves a thousand difficulties which we have unnecessarily created to ourselves. It may be a mystery; but then it is the only safe retreat from self-contradiction, absurdity, and atheism."—p. 219.

"It is freely conceded that whatever God foreknows will most certainly and infallibly come to pass. He foreknows all human volitions; and, therefore, they will most certainly and infallibly come to pass, in some manner or other: the bare fact of their future existence is clearly established, by God's foreknowledge of them. And if all human volitions will be brought to pass by the operation of moral causes, then this manner of their existence is foreknown to God, and they will all come to pass in this way; but to take this for granted, is to beg the question. We have just as much right to suppose that God foreknows that the volitions of moral agents are not necessitated, as the necessitarian has to suppose the contrary; and then it would follow that our volitions are necessarily free, or without any producing causes."—p. 141.

"There is no need of lugging the foreknowledge of God into the present controversy, except it be to deceive the mind. For all future events will certainly and infallibly come to pass, whether they are foreknown or not; and foreknowledge can not make the matter any more certain than it is without it. If God should

cease to foreknow all future volitions, or if He had never known them, they would, nevertheless, just as certainly and infallibly come to pass, as if he had foreknown them from all eternity. The bare, naked fact that they are future infers all that is implied in God's foreknowledge of them."—p. 148.

"Let the necessitarian show that God can not foresee future events, unless He have determined to bring them to pass, or unless they are brought to pass by a chain of producing causes, ultimately connected with his own will, and he will prove something to the purpose."—p. 147.

"Has volition an efficient cause? I answer, No. Has it a sufficient 'ground and reason' of its existence? I answer, Yes. No one ever imagined that there are no indispensable antecedents to choice, without which it could not take place. Unless there is a mind, there could be no act of the mind; and unless the mind possessed a power of acting, it could not put forth volitions. The mind, then, and the power of the mind called will, constitute the ground of action or volition.

"But a power to act, it will be said, is not a sufficient reason to account for the existence of action. This is true. The *reason* is to come. The sufficient reason, however, is not an efficient cause; for there is some difference between a blind impulse or force, and rationality. The mind is endowed with various appetites, passions, and desires — with noble affections, and above all, with a feeling of moral approbation and disapprobation. These are not the 'active principles,' or the 'motive powers,' as they are called,—they are the ends of our acting; we simply act in order to gratify them. They exert no influence over the will, much less is the will controlled by them, and hence we are perfectly free to gratify the one or the other of them; to act in obedience to the dictates of conscience, or to gratify the lowest appetites of our natures. We see that certain means must be used in order to gratify the passion, desire, affection or feeling which we *intend* to gratify, and we act accordingly. In this we form our designs or *intentions* free from all influence whatever: nothing acts upon the will; we fix upon the end, and we choose the means to accomplish it. We adopt the means to the end, because there is a fitness in them to accomplish that end or desire; and because, as rational creatures, we perceive that fitness. We act with a view to our desires, but not from the influence of our desires; and our volition is virtuous or

vicious, according to the intention with which it is put forth — according to the design with which it is directed.

"Passion is not 'the gale,' — it is 'the card.' Reason is not the force, — it is the law. All power resides in the free, untrammeled will. He who overlooks this, and blindly seeks for something to 'move the mind to volition,' loses sight of the grand and distinctive peculiarity of man's nature, and brings it down to the dust, subjecting it to the laws of matter and bondage."— p. 216.

"It is contended by Edwards, that it is just as absurd to say that a volition can come into existence without a cause, as it is that a world should do so. It is true that a world can not arise out of nothing, and come into existence itself; and this is also equally true of a volition. But is the mind nothing? Is the will nothing? Is a free, intelligent, designing cause nothing?

"The philosophers of all ages have sought for the efficient cause of volition, but who has found it? Is it in the will? The necessitarian has shown the absurdities of this hypothesis. Is it in the power of motive? This hypothesis is fraught with the same absurdities. Is it in the uncaused volition of the Deity? The younger Edwards could do nothing with this hypothesis. In truth, the efficient cause of volition is nowhere."—p. 217.

"But as we appeal to consciousness, let us pay some little attention to its teaching. We find ourselves, then, possessed of a volition: we find our minds in a state of acting. This is all we discover by the light of consciousness. We see not the effectual power of any cause operating to produce it. What shall we conclude, then? Shall we conclude that there *must* be some cause to produce it? This were not to study nature as the humble servants and interpreters thereof, but to approach it in the attitude of dictators."—p. 227.

"I would not say we are conscious of liberty, for that would not be correct; but I will say that we are conscious of that which leads to the conviction that we are free — that we have a power of contrary choice. As we are not compelled to act, so we know that we may act or not act, so we know that our actions are not necessitated, but may be put forth or withheld. This is liberty — this is a power of contrary choice. We are merely conscious of thought, of feeling, of volition; and we are so made that we are compelled to believe that there is something which thinks, and

feels, and wills. It is thus, by what has been called a fundamental law of belief, that we arrive at the knowledge of the existence of our minds. In like manner, from the consciousness that we do act or put forth volitions, we are forced by a fundamental law of belief to yield to the conviction that we are free. This inference as necessarily results from the observed phenomena of the mind, as [the belief of] the existence of the mind itself results from the same phenomena. And if the doctrine of the necessitarian were true, that volition is a produced effect, we should never infer from it that we have *a power of acting* at all: we should simply infer that we are *susceptible of passive impressions.*"—p. 229.

It is extremely difficult to form any distinct idea of the author's notion of a free agent; and if free agency is what the author represents it to be, it may be safely said that not one in a thousand knows whether he is a free agent or not, merely on the ground that he could not know what free agency is.

In the definition of a free agent given above, the author does not say he can act or not act, in view of circumstances both external or internal—he says merely he *can act*, without being efficiently caused to do so. But he says again that, "As we are not compelled to act, so we know that we may act or not act, so we know that our actions are not necessitated, but may be put forth or withheld." And yet the author says (p. 139), "No one ever held that human volitions are without all necessity, according to Edwards' use of that term; and no one can hold it. No one can deny that there is an indissoluble connexion between the existence of a thing, and the certain and infallible knowledge of its existence. There is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatever more capable of strict demonstration, than that God's certain prescience of volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a contingency of these events, as is without all necessity."

The author says, "God foresees all human volitions, and that it is self-contradictory and absurd to assert that a thing is foreknown, and yet that it may not come to pass, just as it is to assert that a thing is known to exist, and yet at the same time does not exist."—(p. 133.) Now, when we put forth a volition which God foreknows we would put forth, and which He foreknew would not be withheld, and which it would be absurd and contradictory

to say it might not be put forth, or might be withheld, it follows that if we know, when we put forth a volition, that we might not put it forth, we know what "is contradictory and absurd," and what is contrary to the truth; for "the volition," says the author, "will certainly and infallibly come to pass."—(p. 138.) "Foreknowledge infers this kind of necessity, and is not controverted by any sane man that now lives, or that ever has lived."

This the author calls a logical necessity, and it is not the necessity against which he contends. This necessity, he thinks, is compatible with free agency; but the necessity which arises from the connexion between cause and effect, is what he thinks is utterly incompatible with free agency. He says, "Let the necessitarian show that God can not foresee future events, unless He has determined to bring them to pass, or unless they are brought to pass by a chain of causes, ultimately connected with his own will, and he will prove something to the purpose. But let him not talk so boastfully about demonstrations, while there is this exceedingly weak link in the chain of his argument."

This link, I think, is of sufficient strength to bear the whole weight of the argument. The author says, "God foreknows all human volitions, and therefore they will most certainly and infallibly come to pass." Now these human volitions which will most certainly and infallibly come to pass, depend for their certainty on the will of God, or depend not on the will of God. If they depend on the will of God, then God determined to bring them into existence, either directly by his own agency, or by a chain of causes, or by a free agent, or by some other means, which should be effectual. But if human volitions take place infallibly, independent of the will of God, then many highly important events in God's universe take place in such a manner that God neither causes them to be, nor can He prevent them from being; for whatever God knows will infallibly come to pass, can not be prevented either by God or man. Thus the Deity, according to this scheme, is impotent as to many of the most important events in the universe. He is a mere spectator of what depends not on his will for their existence, and of what his will can not prevent. Indeed, the author says, "If God should cease to know all future volitions, or if He had never known them, they would just as certainly and infallibly come to pass, as if He had foreknown them from eternity." This is the necessity of Fate, not that which

arises from the infinite perfections of God. Edwards believed that the volitions of men were future before men were created, because God determined that they should come to pass, and that without that determination they would not be future; or, in other words, would not come to pass, because there would have been no cause to bring them to pass without the determination of God. For, to say that human volitions would as certainly and infallibly come to pass if God had never foreknown them as if He had foreknown them from all eternity, is the same as saying human volitions would infallibly be the same that they are, whether there is a God or not.

And to show that he is not merely playing upon the words future volitions (the word *future* meaning *that which will come to pass*), the author adds: "By bringing in the prescience of the Deity, we do not really strengthen or add to the conclusion in favor of necessity." The difference is, that this reasoning lands us in the necessity of blind Fate, and not the necessity arising from the infinite perfections of God, which Edwards contends for. If the author should think with me, that this is a fair deduction from his scheme, he will abandon the scheme rather than adopt the conclusion.

But it may be demonstrated in a different manner — that whatever God foreknew from all eternity He decreed, thus: Let us suppose, then, that God had his eye on a particular volition. Edwards would say, "As it is a fundamental truth, that no event can come to pass without a cause, the Deity would know that the volition in question would not come to pass without a cause, and that as there was then no cause but Himself, He could not but know that its future certainty implied in his foreknowledge depended on his determination to introduce an adequate cause to produce the volition thus known."

The author will admit that this reasoning is good when applied to every event but volitions; but his doctrine is, that "volition is of such nature that it can not be caused." He grants, however, that the volition in question has a "ground and reason, without which it will not come to pass, and with which it will most certainly and infallibly come to pass." Now, as God determined to bring these grounds and reasons into existence, knowing that if He did the volition in question would infallibly take place, and that if He did not the volition would not take place, his determin-

ing the ground and reason of the volition, was determining the volition itself. This is true even on the absurd supposition that these grounds and reasons are not the cause of the volition — or on the still more absurd supposition, that the volition has no cause. For when the Deity created man, and determined to bring into existence a "ground and reason" of a particular volition, knowing that, if He did so, that particular volition would come into existence, and if He did not do so, that particular volition would not come into existence — nothing could better describe the manner of God's determining that the volition itself should be brought into existence.

It will not do to say, as the author does (229), "As we are not compelled to act, so we know that we may act or not act. This is liberty, — this is a power of contrary choice," — unless the author were to go further, and say, God has created also a sufficient "ground and reason" for not putting forth the volition, at the same time that He created a sufficient ground and reason for putting it forth. Nor would this groundless supposition be sufficient; for as the Deity's foreknowledge implies an infallible certainty that the volition in question will be put forth, it is absurd to suppose at the same time it may not be put forth. Besides, it might be asked why one "ground and reason" should be more effectual than another. Nor would the author be at liberty to infer this power of "contrary choice," even by denying the foreknowledge of God; for by his doctrine of "logical necessity," the volition in question "will certainly and infallibly come to pass, whether it is foreknown or not; and the foreknowledge can not make it more certain than it is without it." "It is just as much a contradiction in terms to say that what is future will [may] not come to pass, as to say what God foreknows will [may] never take place."

Now, Edwards believes that the volitions of men would not come to pass without the decree of God; and I think all consistent theists agree with him: but as the author believes they will come to pass, though the Deity did not decree them, nor foreknow, his system is bound up in an *absolute and blind Fate*, from which there is no escape but by abandoning the doctrine that future volitions are certain, independent of the decree of God.

But what does the author mean by this power of "contrary choice?" He can not mean that we have power not to put forth

a volition, which will infallibly come to pass, and which it would be absurd even to suppose may not come to pass. Nor can he mean that of two contrary things proposed for our choice, we can make that one to appear most eligible which appears least eligible, or that we can make that one most worthy of choice which appears every way unworthy of choice. Even if we had such power, which is impossible, it by no means appears how moral accountability could be founded upon it.

It is, indeed, remarkable that the author does not say we *have* the power of contrary choice, that we may act or not act, but that we *know* we may act or not act. And yet his whole reasoning goes to prove that when there is "sufficient ground and reason" for a volition, the volition will most infallibly come to pass; and it would be the height of absurdity to suppose that it may not come to pass. "To be free, however, it must come to pass without any producing cause." This is the great point with the author: the infallible certainty of the volition's coming to pass may be as absolute as you please, provided only that infallible certainty does not arise from the connection which exists between cause and effect.

He says: "Let it be assumed that a volition is, properly speaking, an effect, and everything is conceded. On this vantage ground the scheme of Necessity may be erected, beyond the possibility of an overthrow. For if volition is an effect properly speaking, it is necessarily produced by its cause."—(p. 55.) And yet the author seems to shrink from the defence of this position, when he is pressed by Edward's objection, that it is just as absurd to say that a volition can come into existence without a cause, as it is that a world should do so. For the author, instead of attempting to answer the objection, says, "It is true that a world can not arise out of nothing, and come into existence itself; and this is equally true of a volition. But is the mind nothing? Is the will nothing? Is a free, intelligent, designing cause nothing?" If the author means by a "free, intelligent, designing cause," the cause of volition, he gives up the point to the necessitarian. If he does not mean that, he makes no answer to the objection. Indeed, it is manifest that no satisfactory answer can be made to the objection, for no reasoning can either increase or diminish the firmness of our belief that everything which begins to exist must have an adequate cause; or, which amounts to the same thing, from noth-

ing, nothing can arise. Nor is our belief in this principle in the least shaken by our ignorance of the cause of any event; and if the author could show (as I think he has not been able to do) that our volitions are caused neither by our minds nor by motives, nor by their united power, he would not be any nearer convincing us that volitions have no cause, than when he began.

In fact, the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, as taught by Edwards, amounts just to this: Any imaginary future events, which have causes to produce them, will come to pass; and any imaginary future events which have not causes to produce them, will not come to pass; and God is the first designing cause of all other causes, and has thus complete control over the whole universe, both of mind and matter.

—But let us see whether the cause of volition is really as inscrutable as the author imagines. Let us see whether it is not quite as well understood as the cause of motions of the body called voluntary. The author has no doubt that volition is the cause of the voluntary motions of the body. Now, the manner in which the will operates, to produce the motion of the body, is entirely unknown; and the only means we have of knowing that volition is the cause of the motion of the body is, that motions uniformly accompany volition: that is, with the volition there is voluntary motion, — without the volition there is not voluntary motion. And as we can repeat the experiment a thousand times, and always with the same result, our minds are so formed that we can not avoid believing that volition is at least a link in the chain of causes, on which voluntary motion of the body depends, in such a manner that it would not take place without the volition, and will take place with the volition.

At least, this conviction applies to all the voluntary motions to which we attend; but as there are a thousand voluntary motions, as we call them, produced every day, of which we take no notice, we can only infer from analogy that these motions are also produced by volitions, of which we are equally unconscious; for the moment we turn our attention to any continued motion of the body, we become instantly conscious that the motion does not occur without the volition. If we ask the physiologist how these motions are produced, he will tell us the body is a machine so contrived, that by having the origin of the muscles in one bone and the insertion in another, when we will to bend a member of

the body, the mind sends a nervous fluid through the flexor muscles, which causes them to swell in thickness and contract in length; and this contraction or shortening of the muscle causes the member to bend; and the same operation is produced on the extensors when we will to straighten a member. Ask the natural philosopher what this nervous fluid is, or whether there is any which the mind sends through the muscles, in volition, he will tell you he does not know; but he will show you by experiment that the magneto-electric fluid produces so powerful a contraction in the length of the flexor muscles of the fingers, that volition is not able to open the hand while under the operation. He will show you by experiment that the galvanic fluid produces, in the recently dead bodies of men, violent contortions of face, and great muscular motion in the arms and legs. He will show you a galvanic battery made by bringing in contact similar muscles of recently-killed animals, similar parts of the muscles touching dissimilar. He will show you that if one end of a wire be thrust into the brain of a living animal, and the other end into the hinder or lower part of the animal, an electric current will immediately pass along the wire. He will show you the electric eel and the torpedo, which not only generate electricity, but discharge it in large quantities, at will, into surrounding bodies. At the same time he will tell you, if you infer from all these experiments that the human mind has the power, at will, to discharge through any particular muscle a quantity of electricity, that you infer what, in the present state of science, can not be proved, and that, if it could be proved, we might probably be as much in the dark as ever as to how the mind operates on the fluid, or how the fluid operates on the muscle. I have said this much merely to show how little we know of the operation of causes in producing a most familiar effect, the motion of the body; and yet this want of knowledge does not in the least weaken our most perfect belief that there is a cause for this motion, whether we have discovered what it is or not. However, as we know that, in the normal state of the body, voluntary motion always takes place when we will it, and does not take place when we do not will it, and that we can not even try to move the body either without the will or contrary to the will, we have the highest reason to believe that volition is the cause of voluntary motion, in the sense that *with* the volition the motion will take place, and that *without* it the motion

will not take place. Moreover, we have the same reason to believe that we have the power to move the body with the volition, and no power to move the body without the volition. Thus it appears that the distinction between physical and moral power, which some authors make, is without foundation — there is no physical power without moral; we can not do anything either without our will or contrary to our will. I do not speak of our thoughts, desires, and sensations, which we are said rather to *have* than to *do* — though subsequent thoughts, desires and sensations are often remotely dependent for their existences on previous volitions; and yet it is not inconsistent with this, as will be shown presently, that volitions depend *directly*, for their existence, on *thoughts*, *beliefs*, and *desires* combined. God has so arranged that each effect shall be itself the cause of a subsequent event. Nothing is useless in his universe — everything tends towards perfection. God has not yet done creating — so far as man is concerned, his creation is just begun, not merely as to those which are yet to be born, but as to those which have been born. When a child is born into the world, his creation is just commenced, and manifestly proceeds but a short distance during threescore and ten years. Nor is this anomalous: God takes immense periods to create every thing of great value, and what is of greater value than a human soul?

At the very commencement of man's creation, his intellectual being appears almost an entire negation — no dawn of reason, no volition; the first mental phenomenon exhibited is pain, from want. As yet, not even a desire for food is formed; for a desire for anything can not be formed until there is intellect to think that the pain of want may be removed by the thing desired. In the course of a few months, however, we find reason begin to dawn; and with the aid of memory, and repeated experience, the child evidently draws the deduction, that the pain of want is relieved by the mother's breast. This is probably one of the first deductions of reason that an infant draws. It is not at all probable, that the frequent returns of pain from want, and the frequent reliefs from that pain, would be recollected and associated together in such a manner as to enable the infant to draw the deduction on the recurrence of the pain, that the pain might be removed, before he would associate his relief from pain and his mother's breast together. If he makes the former association first, he will then

probably form a *desire* on the recurrence of the pain, merely to be free from the pain; but this desire can not result in volition: for as yet the infant does not know that any means exist to relieve him from the pain, and there can be no volition until the mind is so far created as to have some object in view, accompanied with a belief that that object can be obtained by volition. Indeed, a *volition is formed by the mind from a desire for something, and a belief that the thing desired may be obtained by putting forth the volition.* Experiments may be contrived and performed a thousand ways to test the truth of this assertion.

Suppose, for instance, we have not been able to obtain food for a considerable time, and our desire for food becomes very strong; food is now presented for our acceptance, and there is nothing to hinder us from gratifying our desire but the will: if the experiment should be tried ten thousand times, it would result every time the same way, in a formation of volition to take the food and eat. If the food, however, should be presented to us when we felt a strong aversion to eating, which, for the sake of uniformity of expression, may be called a desire not to eat, then would the result be just as uniform as before, a will not to eat: it being understood in both cases, that no evil is apprehended by following the desires.

To prove that the volition does not result from the simple desire, without the belief that the desire may be gratified by the volition, the experiment may be tried in various instances; and it will always be found, however strong the desire is, no volition will be formed while the mind believes that the desire can not be gratified.

For example: A criminal condemned to death may desire to run off from prison, but while he is satisfied that the walls of his prison can not be broken, and that there is no possibility of escape, the volition to run off will not be formed; but let his chains be thrown off, and the prison door opened, in such a manner as to create a belief that he may escape, the volition will be instantly formed. Open the prison door, however, to a prisoner who desires to stay in prison, and his belief that he may escape will not be sufficient to induce the mind to form the volition to go out. Offer an inducement to the prisoner sufficient to create a desire to leave the prison, and then the mind will instantly form the volition. By varying these experiments indefinitely any one

may easily satisfy himself that when the desire, and the belief that there is nothing to hinder the gratification of the desire, are both present in the mind, then the volition is formed, but that the volition is not formed when either the desire or belief is wanting.

Thus it clearly appears, that we have the same reason for believing that a desire, and belief that the desire may be gratified, are the cause of the mind's forming a volition, in the sense that *with* the desire and belief the volition will be formed, and *without* the desire and belief the volition will not be formed, that we have to believe that volition is the cause of voluntary motion of the body. It must be recollected, however, that it is the mind which forms the volition — the same mind which has the desire and belief.

As we drew the conclusion before, that we have no power to produce motion in the body, if we have not the will, or do not make the volition, so now we may draw the conclusion that we have no power to form a volition, if we have not the desire, and the belief that the thing desired may be done.

This conclusion will be confirmed by taking notice of what passes in our mind when two desires exist in it, in such a manner that they both can not be gratified. Suppose, for instance, that we learn at the same moment, that it is highly important to our interests to attend to some business in the north, and, also, that a beloved child is taken dangerously ill in the south. Our pecuniary interests lead us one way, our affection for our child the other. If one of these desires is felt to be much stronger than the other, there will be no hesitation in forming a volition according with the strongest desire; but, if the mind can perceive no difference in the strength of the desires, which is a case rarely if ever occurring, then the mind will not choose one in preference to the other, but it will choose one in preference to neither.

If every part of infinite space is identically like every other part, we can not conceive that God, with his infinite intelligence, could make any choice of one part in preference of another to place the universe in, when He created it; He only chose one part in preference to none: for, when the mind perceives no difference between two things, it can not decide that one is better or preferable to another. Examples of this kind may be multiplied at pleasure, and we will always find that the volition will correspond with the strongest desire, of which consciousness alone is judge.

In our present imperfect state (and by imperfect state I mean our incomplete creation), it frequently happens, that our desires to gratify our passions or appetites are opposed to our desires to gratify our conscience or moral sense. Our moral sense is created much later than our appetites, and in the incipient stage of our existence they rule the will almost entirely. God has contrived it so that the moral sense increases in strength faster than our passions and appetites, and must finally get the complete ascendency; if not in this world, certainly in the next, as certainly as God is infinitely wise and good. We see, even in this world, that the sexual sense is not created until the moral sense is considerably advanced in its creation — a wise and beneficent arrangement; for the sexual sense without the moral sense would lead to many evils. As it is, the moral sense is not always able to restrain its gratification within the bounds of right reason.

One of the chief offices of the moral sense is, by the pleasure which its approbation affords, and by the pain which its disapprobation produces, to induce us to gratify our passions and appetites, so as at the same time to increase, if possible, the happiness, but never to diminish the comfort and well-being of others. One of the means God has taken to effect his purpose of increasing its power is to cause us always, on a review of our conduct, to feel gratified when our moral sense has prevailed over a passion or appetite, which otherwise would have been indulged at the expense of others' comfort, and to feel mortified and ashamed when the moral sense was overcome. This experience certainly tends to strengthen the moral sense, and give it more power for victory in future.

At birth, there being no use for the moral sense, it is not yet created; indeed, it can not begin to exist before the dawn of reason, for it is the reason applied to the moral conduct, accompanied with a feeling of approbation or disapprobation. "By the wise contrivance of God, even our senses and appetites are so constituted for our happiness, that what they immediately make grateful, is generally on other accounts also useful, either to ourselves or to mankind." * This is peculiarly the case with the moral sense. And it is so far superior to all our other senses in this respect, that what it approves we call *right*, and what it dis-

* Hutcheson's Philosophy.

approves we call *wrong*. The original meaning of the word *right* is straight, and of *wrong*, crooked or twisted. Now, when we examine the nature of those actions which the moral sense approves, they are found generally to lead *straight* to happiness, without producing misery either to ourselves or others; whilst those actions which the moral sense disapproves, generally lead to unhappiness both of ourselves and others, and in this *crooked* way lead to reformation and happiness.

If our moral sense sometimes approves of actions leading to unhappiness, both of ourselves and others, this arises, no doubt, from its imperfection — God not yet having completed its creation. But when its creation shall be completed, in the next life, it is highly probable that its dictates will universally lead *straight* to happiness. It is, also, highly probable, that the desire to gratify the moral sense, when it shall have become perfect—that is, made complete, or its creation finished—will be so strong as to overcome all opposing desires, if any then should exist; and if so, it will then be impossible to will anything wrong. There will be no desire to will contrary to the moral sense, and where all the desire is on one side, and no evil apprehended from its gratification, the will infallibly agrees with the desire. If it did not, as much inconvenience would be experienced as if the motions of the body did not correspond with the will.

I wish it always to be understood when I speak of all the desires, I mean to include not merely the desire of gratifying the appetites and passions, and external senses, but also especially the desire of gratifying that internal sense, called the moral sense or conscience.

The voluntary motions of the body, therefore, follow the volitions, and the volitions follow the desires, when they are accompanied with a belief that the desire may be gratified without evil apprehended from the gratification. The desires, from which volitions originate, are produced by the presentation to the external or internal senses of certain objects which we believe will increase our pleasure or diminish our pain. Indeed, we can not conceive it possible that desires should not arise in the mind of such a being as man, endowed with sensitivity and reason, and surrounded with objects some capable of producing happiness, and some misery. The beauty of the system is, that God has so arranged it, that even in our present imperfect, unfinished state of creation

those objects which are desirable for their own sakes, and to which we are attracted, not from any view to their being useful in future to ourselves or others, nevertheless, generally contribute to the good of all: and when the creation of the moral sense shall be completed, it is probable that this will be universally the case. Certainly, the more perfect our moral sense becomes in this world, the less do we choose things hurtful to ourselves and others, as means to promote our own happiness.

As sensitive beings, we are necessarily fond of pleasure and averse to pain; consequently, those things which appear capable of producing pleasure cause desire, and those things which appear capable of producing pain cause aversion; for our beliefs always correspond to the appearances of things, or, in other words, to what appears to be the evidence of their truth. Whenever there is sufficient evidence, belief follows, and whenever there is not sufficient evidence, belief does not follow. We can not determine or will to believe *without* evidence, or not to believe *with* evidence; and the evidence itself is just what the nature of the objects and the state or constitution of our mind when the object is presented, necessarily produce.

Now, all theists believe that the nature of objects to produce pleasure or pain, and the constitution of the mind to be so effected, depend for their existence on the will of God; and if so, then all the subsequent links of the chain of causes and effects resulting in human conduct depend, likewise, on God's will. These links of the chain of cause and effect, beginning with human conduct and going upwards, are: *Human conduct proceeds from volition; volition, from desire, with its accompanying belief that the desire may be gratified without evil; desire, from a belief that the object will increase pleasure or diminish pain; belief, from the evidence before the mind that the object is desirable; the desirableness of the object, from the will of God; the will of God, from his desire to do good; his desire to do good, from his infinite wisdom and goodness; and his infinite wisdom and goodness are the first cause of all finite things, being themselves uncaused and uncreatable.*

If we trace the links of the chain of cause and effect downwards, beginning with the conduct of men, we shall find a beautiful and harmonious system, which tends in all its parts to the perfection of the reason, the moral sense, and the happiness of

men. *Volition produces conduct, or action of mind or body; conduct produces pleasure or pain; pleasure or pain, especially pain, produces consideration as to its cause; consideration produces belief according to the evidence; belief produces new desire different from the former, according to the change of belief produced by the preceding experience.* In fact, each moral act becomes, without any intention on our part, an experiment by which we find out, more and more, the causes of happiness and the causes of misery; and, of course, more and more of the laws of morals. For, indeed, *all science, both of physics and morals, both of matter and mind, consists in a knowledge of phenomena, and of the relation that the phenomena have to one another as to uniformity of sequences.*

The knowledge of the uniformity of sequences, which is sometimes called the relation of cause and effect, is of the highest importance; it is the art of manufacturing happiness, both to ourselves and others, and avoiding misery.

Now, that which is calculated to fill us with the highest veneration and love for the great First Cause is, that He has so contrived, that every one, as soon as he has learned the art, will voluntarily practice it from that time forth forever; for our desire of happiness and aversion to misery are as durable as our existence. But what is calculated to raise our veneration, if possible, still higher, is, that God has introduced us into the great school of his universe, where He employs every action which we perform, and every event which comes within our knowledge, to teach us the relation of cause and effect, which is the great element of the art of manufacturing happiness. He has caused us to believe with a confidence that can neither be increased nor diminished by any arguments, for the belief is instinctive and fundamental, that every event must have a cause, and that with the cause it will infallibly take place, and without the cause it infallibly will not take place. He has arranged these causes and effects, so that the one follows the other with perfect uniformity, both in the physical and moral world, for the purpose of enabling us to learn what are the causes, and what the effects. Without this uniformity, we could learn nothing. Indeed, if things took place contingently, there would be nothing to learn.

Nor need we fear that this constitution of things will change, any more than that the perfections of God himself will change. He has given us memory to store up facts or phenomena which

come under our notice, He has given us reason, and is increasing its powers every day to investigate causes, and He has made the exercise of this reason, and the discovery of truth, delightful for its own sake, even when we think not of the utility that will result from increase of wisdom in future.

He has surrounded us with our fellows, and placed them at such a point of view, that they detect many of our vices or defects which escape our own observation. He has inspired them with an instinctive desire to express the disapprobation of their moral sense in the form of blame, without being at all conscious, in many instances, that God uses this expression of disapprobation as means of advancing our creation so far as to remove the defect. Nor are they aware that God uses every feeling of moral approbation and disapprobation which they experience, whether it relates to their own conduct or to the conduct of others, as a means of rendering more perfect their own moral sense; for all our senses, external and internal, are improved by moderate use, nor can we be happy in their entire inactivity.

God has caused us to set a high value on the good opinion of our fellows, especially on the approbation of their moral sense. When we discover by their expression of blame, that certain conduct of ours has not their approbation, a powerful desire springs up, corresponding to the high estimation we have of the value of the good, to try and regain their favor by abstaining from like conduct in future. It is thus God uses his own divine laws of uniformity in his universe, the moral sense of our fellows, nay, even the powers of our own minds, to aid Him in the completion of his grand design, to carry on the work of creating our soul to completion, when our wisdom and goodness will be without defect, to remain thenceforward and forever the source of moral conduct unblameable, and happiness without alloy.

If this is a correct exposition of the relation which mental phenomena bear to each other, it follows that all the volitions, desires, and beliefs which exist, have their causes; and from the inseparable connection which God has established between cause and effect, these phenomena must necessarily exist, and those imaginary volitions, desires and beliefs, which have no cause, must necessarily not exist. If events can only arise from causes, and the connection between the causes and the events can not be broken, or, in other words, if *with* the causes the events invariably occur,

and *without* the causes they do invariably not occur, then the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity is true.

However clear and satisfactory the system of Philosophical Necessity appears to me, I was glad to have an opportunity of examining the views and arguments of an acute mind, in opposition to Edwards, and in favor of *contingency* as the only ground on which liberty and moral agency can be established.

Henry P. Tappan, in a late work on the "Doctrine of the Will determined by an Appeal to Consciousness," maintains, in opposition to the doctrine of necessity, and the fixed connection between cause and effect, that "necessity, real and absolute, does not belong to cause (p. 276); all cause will be found to resolve itself into will, and will is free." That is, when the mind or will of God or man puts forth a volition, the cause of that volition has no more connection with the volition put forth, than it has with hundreds of other imaginable volitions, or with the withholding that volition, and not putting it forth at all. He maintains that it is of the very nature or essence of Will to have the power of putting forth volitions in any direction, not merely according to our pleasure, but contrary to both the dictates of reason and the desires of the heart. "These convictions and these impulses lie in other parts of my being, in my reason and my sensitivity, and do not go to make up a volition, nor do they go in themselves to prevent a volition. I feel within me that I can will against all motives, presented whether by the reason or sensitivity. Let the motives be increased to ever such a degree, I feel that I have power still to will in opposition to these. To will, to put forth the causative *nisus*, is a simple act, which I can always do; it is created solely by myself, and capable of being in any given direction, notwithstanding any motives whatever, for or against." —p. 90.

"In forming our predeterminations, or purposes, and in the causative *nisus*, or volition, there is no resistance overcome, there is no opposing force whatever. I have freedom here as an attribute most unique, both because I purpose and will in entire contingency, and because there is no antagonistic power, that, to my consciousness, impedes or overcomes me in purposing and willing. The motives of action found in reason and passion have no

analogy whatever to physical forces, as plainly appears from this one fact, that where a resistance exists to a physical force, to a degree likely to overcome the physical force, and to produce phenomena in the direction of the antagonistic power, we can conceive of such an augmentation of the physical force as shall finally overcome the antagonistic power. But will, on the contrary, acts with the same effect when it determines in opposition to infinite motives properly and intrinsically considered, as when it determines in opposition to slight motives." — p. 89.

"When the mind chooses simply in relation to the reason, should we ask why it chooses thus, the only legitimate answer is, that it thus chooses. When the mind chooses simply in relation to the sensitivity, should we ask why it chooses thus, the only legitimate answer is, that it thus chooses." [And when the mind chooses contrary to all motives, let the motives be increased to ever such a degree, should it be asked why it thus chooses, the only legitimate answer is, that it thus chooses.] "In other words, the choice is a primary fact, and has no fact going before by which it is to be explained." — p. 228.

"It is, then, this self-conscious power of determining or not determining, of causing or not causing—this contingent power—this power all-sufficient to move itself and put forth the causative *nisus*, or withhold the causative *nisus* — which makes up the idea of freedom." — p. 90.

"Contingency and necessity are opposite ideas and negate each other. There is an idea opposed to necessity, multitudes are ready spontaneously to aver. Let us see whether the consciousness recognizes this idea, and is able to define it intelligibly to itself, as well as to find subjects to which it may be legitimately applied.

"Contingency is that which is, or may be, but which might not have been, or might be different from what it is. We plainly have this idea. I appeal to every man's consciousness. This book lying before us is, but it is conceivable that it might not have been, or that it might be different from what it is. In relation to the will of God, He might have prevented it. In relation to the will of the author, he might not have written it, or might have written a different book, or might have destroyed it after it was written. But we can form no such conception of $2+2=4$. We can form no such conception of the being of God,

nor of the existence of time and space. What is true of this book, is true of every production of human art and power. Now all human art and power run back ultimately to human volitions : the contingency of all the sequents of human volitions must, therefore, be referred to the contingency of the volitions themselves. If the sequents of the volitions, which appear to us contingent, are really so, then the volitions must be contingent likewise ; for the necessity of the volitions would necessitate all the sequents connected with them by a fixed law. Now what is the testimony of every man's consciousness respecting the volitions ? Does it sustain the logical inference above given ? Are volitions necessary or contingent ? It does not appear to me difficult to answer upon this point. If consciousness is clear and decisive upon any question of psychology, it certainly is clear and decisive here. Let us take any volition whatever ; let us multiply and vary the examples indefinitely, and the result is clearly the same.

" I make an effort or volition to attend to this book, or to this conversation, or to this subject of thought, and in every act of attention, I have this conviction : I might not attend, or I might attend to something else. Again, I make a volition to raise my arm, to move my foot, to get up and walk, to sit down, or to make any muscular movement whatever ; and in all these volitions I have this conviction : I might forbear to make the volition, or I might make a different volition. I have no consciousness of my power antecedent to my own causality, compelling or necessitating that causality in any particular direction. I appear to myself the sole cause of my volitions, and I appear to myself a cause acting contingently. In any given case of causality, I can not but think that I can forbear to do what I am doing, or can exercise my causality in a way entirely different.

" What my consciousness thus testifies respecting myself, I can not but apply to the Deity likewise. If I have this power to do or not to do, He, as the first infinite mind, must surely have this power. Hence, as I actually do conceive of creation as contingent — that is, I conceive that it might not be, or it might be different from what it is, or it might cease to be—so here likewise, as in the case of human causality, I refer the contingency of all creation, and of all its changes, to the contingency of the divine volitions.

" When God said, ' Let there be light,' it was positively neces-

sary that light should appear — necessary relatively to his infinite power; but we clearly conceive that God was under no necessity of putting forth the volition or creative *nisus* represented by the phrase, 'Let there be light.' We may not deny Him an attribute which we possess ourselves. A necessitated Creator could not create free agents. A dependent and finite mind can not exceed the measure of the first and infinite.

"So decisive are our conceptions on this subject, that the moment we suppose mind as cause to be necessitated in the exercise of its causality, we seem to destroy mind itself, and to bring it down to the mere condition of physical causes. Physical causes can not but act under their appropriate circumstances, and can not but act uniformly. Fire must burn when thrown amidst combustibles. The various elementary substances of chemistry must unite according to their definite proportions—a stone thrown into the air must fall to the ground. Here is no choice on the part of the physical cause. But with ourselves, and with all beings like ourselves, we know it is quite different. We choose the direction of our causality, and we can vary it every moment. We do not say of ourselves, I must lift this arm; I must move this foot; I must take hold of this chair; I must read this book,—but we say, I can do this or not, just as I please. And when we use this language, we do not mean that if we make the effort or volition it will be done — *e. g.*, if I please or will to move my arm, my arm will move; but we mean that the effort or volition itself is entirely within our power [even in opposition to all our desires or motives, let the motives be increased to ever such a degree, even to infinity (p. 89); for as the strong convictions of our reason, and the strong impulses or repugnances of our sensitivity, lie — not in the will, but—in other parts of our being, in forming our causative nisus or volition, there is no resistance overcome, no opposing force whatever]. We can make the volition or forbear to make it, and in either case there is plainly no consciousness of compulsion or necessity. Now how absurd it would be to say of fire when placed amid combustibles, it can burn or not burn [as it pleases], or of a stone thrown up into the air, it can fall or not fall [as it pleases]. The difference between ourselves as causes and physical causes is only made out in this way, and in this way is plainly made out, viz.: physical causes are necessitated causes—we are contingent causes."—pp. 66, 67, 89, 90.

Many other passages of similar import might be selected from the work, but these are sufficient to show what the author believes to be the only foundation of human and divine freedom — the contingency of volitions. The author agrees with the Necessitarian, that all phenomena in the physical world arise necessarily from their causes, in consequence of an inseparable connexion established by God himself between the causes and the phenomena which they produce.

So, if I understand the author aright, he admits that all mental phenomena, with the exception of volition, are necessary: such as pleasurable and painful feelings, desires and aversions, hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, approbation and disapprobation, certainty and doubt. I perhaps ought to have mentioned error, as well as volition, as not belonging to necessity, for he says (p. 277), "Error is not necessary. It is not a necessary development of reason. It is not a motion of the sensitivity arising necessarily from its constitution. All error belongs primarily to the element of freedom, and is somehow connected with the determinations of the will."

But this is a mere insulated assertion; and as from the manner of its enunciation it appears that the author felt himself altogether incompetent to show how it is possible for an ignorant being to avoid all error, I do not consider this as one of the deliberate opinions of the author. It probably occurred to his mind that erroneous opinions are sometimes censurable; and if so, according to his view of responsibility, praise and blame, these erroneous opinions could not be altogether unavoidable.

Let us examine what ground the author has for believing that creation and all its changes are contingent, in the sense of his definition of contingent — that whatever event is, might not have been, or might be different from what it is.

As to the possibility of a thing's being different from what it is, it is a contradiction in terms, and plainly absurd: a thing can not be different from itself — if it is different, it is another thing. How would it sound to say, Alexander the Great might have been very different from what he was, if he had been born of a different mother. If this is contingency, it neither can exist nor be conceived of.

The other part of the definition is not self-contradictory. Let us examine what it means: "An event is, but might not have

been." The latter clause is always used, in common parlance, subjunctively; and, of course, another verb is either expressed or understood, with its adjunct *if*, or something equivalent. In the present instance, the sense would be completed thus: An event is, but it might not have been, if proper means had been used to prevent it. This is the manner in which the author uses it, in the example quoted above. He says a book is, but it might not have been; for in relation to the will of God, He might have prevented it. Again, it might not have been; for in relation to the will of the author, he might not have written it. Now, this is exactly equivalent to saying, it might not have been, if God had determined to prevent it; it might not have been, if the author had determined not to write it. On the supposition, however, that God had determined to prevent it, it would be proper to say not merely that the book might not be, but that the book would infallibly not be. So, on the supposition that the author had not determined to write the book, it would be proper to say not merely that the book might not have been, but that the book would infallibly not be. Now, this is precisely what the Necessitarian understands by the term necessity, the sure and certain connection that God has established between the antecedent called cause, and the consequent called effect. It appears, then, that by the author's own account, in an example brought forward by himself, to illustrate and explain contingency, the doctrine of Necessity is proved — at least as far as the example itself extends.

The author goes on to observe, "What is true of this book is true of every production of human art and power; but these productions being the sequents of volitions, if the sequents are contingent as they appear to be, then the volitions must be contingent likewise; and he calls upon consciousness, which is the only evidence he brings forward, to prove that whenever he makes a volition to raise his arm, to move his foot, to get up or sit down, or to make any muscular movement whatever, he has this conviction [from consciousness], that he might forbear to make the volition, or might make a different volition."

Now, it is shown by writers on the subject, that it is not the office of consciousness to decide the truth or falsehood of such propositions as "I can withhold any volition I make," any more than it is the office of the ear to decide what is the color of a rose. It is the office of reason to decide all such questions, and it is the

office of consciousness to decide what mental phenomena actually occur — such as thoughts, sensations, desires, and volitions — and of the existence of these we have no evidence but that of consciousness.

Besides, it is impossible for our consciousness to be exercised every time we make a volition to produce any muscular motion whatever, in deciding that we could withhold the volition, or make a different volition, for this reason alone: that in at least ninety-nine out of one hundred of these volitions, no thought enters the mind, either of withholding the volition or making another.

Now, it is manifest that we are not conscious of anything that does not enter the mind, even in thought; and also, that we can not make a volition which it does not enter our mind to make; nor can we have a "conviction" arising from any source, that at the time of making a volition we might withhold it, if the thought of withholding it does not enter our mind. Besides, when the thought of withholding the volition does enter the mind, which only occurs when there are motives on both sides, it is found, whenever consciousness is consulted, that it decides that motive to be the strongest according to which the volition is actually made. Consciousness, then, furnishes no ground to believe in the contingency of volitions; let us examine further what reason says on the subject; and for the sake of distinctness, we will take a particular volition — that, for example, of Peter's volition to deny his master. Previous to the event, these two propositions or assertions may be made concerning it: Peter will make the volition to deny his master; Peter will not make the volition to deny his master. One of these assertions, made even a million of years before the event, is true — the other is false. If we suppose the first to be true, "Peter will put forth the volition," then you may suppose Peter's power to withhold volitions, or to make volitions of any kind, as great as you please — he can not prevent that volition from coming to pass which will come to pass. Nay, you may call in the infinite power of God; God himself can not even will to prevent that from coming to pass which He knows will come to pass. Nor does this assertion infringe in the slightest degree on his infinite power; for, according to the doctrine of Necessity, the truth of the assertion, "Peter will make a volition to deny his master," depended on the will of God; and it is not

inconsistent with infinite power to say that God can not will contraries.

To a being who sees the future as plain as the present, it is the same contradiction to say of a volition, it may be put forth, and it may not be put forth, as to say of the present, concerning a volition, it is put forth, and it is not put forth. So there is the same contradiction in saying, before the event, Peter's power may be exerted in such a manner as to put forth the volition to deny his master; and Peter's power may be exerted in such a manner as not to put forth the volition to deny his master [using the word *may* unconditionally]; as it would be to say, after the event, Peter's power has been exerted in such a manner that he has put forth the volition to deny his master; and Peter's power has been exerted in such a manner that he has not put forth the volition to deny his master.

The history of the future is just as certain as if it were written by the finger of God, including all human volitions; and it is manifestly impossible for any man ever to exert his power so as to prevent any volition from being put forth which God knows belongs to this history. This argument of Edwards, the author has not attempted to answer, except by merely saying (page 249), if this argument be true, "A system of absolute fatalism prevails." If the author had said, "Universal necessity, arising out of the infinite necessary perfections of God," he would have said exactly what Edwards brought forward the argument to prove; but the word *fatalism* (which seems to have been introduced here for the purpose of throwing odium on an argument which he could not refute, and which I think can not be refuted) conveys the idea of Universal Necessity, independent of the will and perfections of God. The system of Edwards is as different from this as theism is from atheism.

It is but justice, however, to the author to state, and show by quotations, that so great is the power of truth, and so clearly did he conceive it on this point, that when he forgot for a moment his doctrine of contingency, he stated, with a clearness and strength not excelled by Edwards himself, some of the strongest features and foundation-principles of Universal Necessity, originating in the infinite perfections of God; and embracing not merely all the good actions of men, but all the evil, in such infallible certainty and inevitability that God himself can not prevent

them, being incidental to a system which *must* be the best, since it was projected by infinite wisdom, and which, as being the best, *must* have been selected by Him as the all-wise and all-powerful.

But when he had the doctrine of contingency full in view, he referred "the contingency of all creation, and of all its changes, to the contingency of the divine volitions." Instead of saying, then, that the Deity *must* have selected the system that appears to Him best, he says we may not deny the Deity an attribute which we possess ourselves : the power of willing or not willing to create the present universe, or to create an entirely different one ; and that, too, contrary to all motives furnished by the reason and sensitivity.

When God put forth the volition to create this glorious and beautiful universe, filled with benign contrivances to create and continually increase our happiness, giving us bodies furnished with senses fitted to derive pleasure from all surrounding objects, and souls filled to overflowing with delight, in contemplating the perfections of the glorious Creator, He might have put forth a volition to place us in a universe where every sensation would be a pain, and every thought of its Creator a horror. Or, instead of creating within us a moral sense, approving of all kindness, justice, and veracity, as He has done, and also contriving it so that our mistakes should work out their own correction, He might have willed that our moral sense should approve of all cruelty, injustice and falsehood, and contrived it so that error should perpetuate itself forever.

The possibility of such volitions as these being made by the Deity, instead of those which He has actually made, is necessarily implied in his free agency. A free agent does not say of himself, I must do this, I must do that, but I can do this or not, as I please ; nay, even contrary to my desire, however strong that desire may be, and contrary to the dictates of my moral sense and desire both. For example : I come into a room where I find my dearest friends assembled — my mother and sisters, and a young lady to whom I am ardently attached : my moral sense revolts at the thought of treating any of them with rudeness, indelicacy, and insult ; I have the strongest desire to retain their love and respect ; I put forth a volition to spit on one, to slap another in the face, pull another's nose, and treat my intended bride with the most

shameful rudeness and indelicacy, causing at the same time the most agonizing feelings in my own breast.

"I appeal to consciousness whether we do not conceive of the possibility, and the actual power, to do acts which disgust our moral feelings; and do we not conceive of this at the very moment we feel this disgust, and in the very face of it?"—p. 195.

"It is this self-conscious power of determining or not determining, of causing or not causing, this contingent power — this power all-sufficient to move itself and put forth the causative nisus, or to withhold the causative nisus, — which makes up the idea of freedom."— p. 91.

Whilst the author's mind is filled with his motive of universal contingency, this is the manner in which he speaks of the free agency of God and man; and apparently aware that reason will afford him no assistance, he calls upon consciousness to testify to the truth of his assertions. Consciousness declares she knows nothing of the matter; she only knows there are desires and volitions, and thoughts and feelings; whether they even belong to a being which desires, and wills, and thinks, and feels, or not, she does not know. Memory, however, volunteers her testimony, that desire always precedes volition, and reason as *Amicus Curiæ* declares the universal law to be that where one event follows another uniformly, the uniformity is not contingent, but designed.

But when the author forgets for a time his doctrine of universal contingency, and speaks about the perfections of God and the origin of evil, even Edwards himself would be pleased to listen. Hear what he says: "When God created free agents, He, as omniscient, must have known all the possible forms and conditions under which they might be created and constituted; and as He is all-wise and all-mighty, He must have selected, in his actual creations, the best possible forms and conditions of such beings. In making and constituting free agents under the best possible forms and conditions, He, as omniscient, must have foreseen all the actions, which in the exercise of their free agency they would *certainly* perform, and among these He must have foreseen, likewise, their sinful actions.

"Sinful actions being those which violate and transgress the laws of rectitude, which God approves and loves with all the energy of his nature, can not in themselves, or in any point of

view, be pleasing to Him. They are incidental to a system of creation which He approves, but then they are incidental *evils*.

"If God conceived of a system of free agency, in which He foresaw that these incidental evils would not take place, still this system must have been known to Him, on some other accounts, not to be the best system; for, if in all respects a system of free agency without these incidental evils had been conceived of as the best system, an infinitely good and wise Being must have projected it.

"These evils, incidental to a system of free agency, God could not, by the very hypothesis, prevent. They are *incidental* to it. To say that God could have prevented them, and yet have constituted the system as it is, is a plain absurdity."—pp. 254, 255.

We would be disposed to believe, if we did not know the contrary, that the above quotations were copied from the arguments of the Necessitarians, to be afterwards refuted. Certainly no Necessitarian ever expressed the doctrine of Universal Necessity arising from the will of God, in stronger terms.

God *must* have foreseen the best system [not might have foreseen or not foreseen], He *must* have selected the best system [not might have selected or not selected], He *must* have foreseen all the actions of men,—even their sinful actions—which were incidental to this system, and which He knew would certainly come to pass, with such infallibility that He could not prevent them, if He selected the system which He has selected, and which He *must* have selected, there being no other better system to select.

The description here given by the author of the relation between the volition of God and the future actions of men, including even their sinful actions, corresponds exactly with the Necessitarian notion of cause and effect. The Necessitarians believe that the connection between cause and effect is so firm that they never can be separated—that is, with the cause the effect will certainly come to pass, without the cause the effect will certainly not come to pass. And they believe that this connection depends on the perfections of God. Now the paragraphs above contain the idea as plainly as if expressed in direct terms, that with the volition of God to create the present universe the wicked actions and volitions of men would certainly come to pass, and without the volition of God to create the present universe the wicked actions of men would certainly not come to pass. They also contain the idea that with the perfections of the Deity the voli-

tion to create the present universe would certainly be put forth, and without the perfections of the Deity the volition to create the present universe would certainly not be put forth. Thus all events are traced up to the infinite perfections of God; and as these perfections are not events — that is, did not begin to exist,— they have no antecedent, but existed necessarily from all eternity, uncaused.

Of efficient causes we know nothing. It may be that there is but one efficient—that is, the great First Cause. Those antecedents which invariably precede their sequents, which we call causes, are certainly sometimes not the efficient causes; as the want of food, followed invariably with the pain of hunger. A mere negative or nonentity can not be the cause of anything. The efficient cause is undoubtedly some positive entity, producing constant change in the body, which always results in pain when food is not used for a certain length of time. And yet, though we do not know the efficient cause of pain in this instance, we have no more doubt that there is a cause than in those cases that are preceded by positive entities.

Our belief that an event has a cause, and must have a cause, does not arise from the uniformity with which we see it follows another event; for if we saw it preceded every time of its occurrence by a different antecedent, we would believe still that it had the same cause uniformly preceding it, which we had not yet discovered.

We know not whether God has or has not given power to antecedents to be the efficient causes of the events which uniformly follow them; but this we know, that if He has, the chain of causes and effects, when traced upwards, must terminate in God, whose perfections are not events, and therefore uncaused. For, as it is a fundamental truth that everything which begins to exist must have a cause, so it is a fundamental truth that what did not begin to exist can not have a cause. Besides, if invariable antecedents are not efficients, they may, for aught we know, be indispensable means, by which God himself becomes the efficient cause. Indeed, in many cases, it would seem to contain a contradiction to say, God could have produced a particular effect, without using the very means employed. How could Solomon have been Solomon, unless he had been born of David and Bath-sheba? And yet no one believes that David and Bath-sheba were the efficient cause of Solomon. God was as truly the Creator of Solomon as He was of Adam and Eve.

Though God has seen proper to conceal from our view the operation of efficient causes, and has not permitted us at present to know

whether there are any but the first great Cause himself, yet He has given enough to furnish the means of knowledge suited to our state, in the uniformity of sequences, both in the world of mind and in the world of matter. It fully answers our purpose in reasoning to call by the name of cause that antecedent with which the event takes place, and without which it does not take place. For example, we call a desire, with its accompanying belief that the desire may be gratified without evil, the cause of the following volition merely because our experience teaches us that volition invariably follows. Now the desire and accompanying belief are not the efficient cause of the volition ; for as they themselves could not exist without a mind, so neither could they produce a volition without a mind. It is much more probable that the mind is the efficient cause of the volition, than that the desire which precedes it is the cause. Yet, as the mind may exist without the desire, but the desire can not exist without the mind, we speak of the desire being the cause of the volition — or, at least, the *sine qua non* — of the mind's becoming efficient. If the Deity has constituted the mind as the real efficient cause (which we have no means of knowing), then, on this supposition, He has also arranged it so that the mind always becomes efficient when the desire, and belief that the desire may be gratified without evil, are in the mind, and never becomes efficient when they are not in the mind.

So, though the efficient cause of gravitation probably does not reside in the sun, yet as *with* the sun the efficient cause of gravitation acts according to a fixed law, and *without* the sun it would not act, by assuming the sun to be the cause, all our deductions as to the motions of the planets are as correct as if we knew the real efficient cause ; for it is only when the sun is present that the real cause becomes efficient, and, as far as we know, *can* become efficient. So, if volition is not the efficient cause of voluntary motions in our bodies, God has so arranged that the real cause never acts or becomes efficient without volition, and with volition it always does act. Indeed, it seems much more probable that the mind itself is the efficient cause of voluntary motion, than that volition, a mere phenomenon of mind, should be ; and, if so, it would seem that the effort which the mind is conscious of in operating on body, is called volition, just as the operation of body on mind is called sensation.

It is curious and interesting to read the author's views on this

subject. His theory of contingency rendered it necessary for him to invent a new psychology. According to this new theory, of all the phenomena of the mind, sensations and volitions only are effects. "The sensations are effects of physical causes; the volitions are effects of the power of the mind, called will. The desires, passions and emotions are not effects: they are evidently not effects of the will, nor of physical causes, and if they be effects at all, the causation which produces them must lie either in the substance of the sensitivity itself, or in the cognitions of the intelligence which always precedes them, or in both. But if we grant this causality to lie in the sensitivity or in cognitions, then we remove causality from the will, where we had concentrated it, and disperse it generally through the whole mental faculties, and even through the mental phenomena: we destroy the very distinctions to which our previous investigations had conducted us" [and then our theory could not stand].

After assigning various reasons, the author comes to this conclusion, that "the relation of the intelligence to its cognitions, and the relation of the sensitivity to the desires, emotions and passions, is the relation of substance and its attributes, inasmuch as these attributes are its necessary developments. We can not conceive of the substance without these attributes or manifestations, nor can we conceive of the manifestations without the substance. In will, we conceive of simply a power to do or not to do, without affixing to it any necessary attributes or manifestations."

The chief reason assigned by the author for this conclusion is, that "all the different forms of cognition are really a development of that which existed before. The primitive judgments existed in the capacity of the reason; and the emotions, and passions, and desires, have a necessary existence in the capacity or potentiality of the sensitivity, there being, in these faculties, no potentiality to know and feel differently from what they do know and feel." "But, with the will, every volition is a new creation. It had no being until it actually appeared, inasmuch as it appeared under an equal possibility of the very opposite volition; it had no existence in the preëxisting potentiality of the will."

Now, it would appear from this psychology, that the author believes there are several different substances in the mind, having each different attributes or properties; and as "we can not con-

ceive of the substance without the manifestations," it will follow, also, that these substances were created at different times; for as there were no manifestations of the passions and desires till after the cognitions appeared, it follows that the substance of the sensitivity, of which the passions and desires are the manifestations, could not exist until after the existence of the substance of the intelligence, of which the cognitions are the manifestations.

Again, as the cognitions of the intelligence do not appear till after the sensations derived from the senses, it follows that the substance of the intelligence is created after the substance to which the sensations belong; and as the substance to which the sensations belong was created before the appearance of the cognitions, and the substance to which the passions and desires belong was created after the appearance of the cognitions (292), it follows that there must be one substance for the sensations and another for the passions and desires; for if it is the same substance, it would have to be created both before and after the appearance of the cognitions, which is absurd. It appears to me, that by the same mode of reasoning we would infer that there is another substance of the will, of which volition is the phenomenon or manifestation, created after all the rest; for the phenomenon of volition does not appear till after cognitions and desires both appear. But the author will not allow that will has any necessary attributes or manifestations, and, of course, is not a substance. According to his idea of will, it might put forth no volition at all; for every time it does put forth a volition, it has an equal potentiality to put forth none: as "the relation between cause and effect is one of contingency and freedom; and any given cause may be thought of as having potentiality to effects, but without being connected with any particular effects as its necessary manifestations" (293). If these deductions are just, from the doctrine that cognitions, and passions and desires are not effects, but properties of substances, the doctrine itself must be unsound; and the author himself acknowledges, that "if he grants that effects are produced by any power of the mind except the will, the very distinctions to which his previous investigations had conducted him are destroyed." Besides, we are conscious of making efforts in the exercise of the reason, and in the creations of the imagination, as well as in the putting forth of volitions; and that theory can hardly be true which maintains that Milton, when his imagination created the

Paradise Lost, made no effort, and produced no effect except by his will: or that the inventor of the steam-engine made no effort when he was imagining its various parts and the principles of its operation, and produced no effects but volitions. Indeed, I think it is quite certain that no one would ever have imagined that sensations and volitions were effects, and passions, and emotions, and desires, and beliefs, and imaginings and cognitions not effects, unless he was driven to it to support a favorite theory. Now the theory of Contingency, as the foundation of freedom, is considered by the author as so important, that he says (p. 172, corrected in the errata), if he were obliged to do either, he would rather give up the prescience of God than his freedom; meaning, by his freedom, that there is an equal potentiality in his will to do good and to do evil, though in doing evil he would be acting in opposition to all motives furnished by his intelligence and goodness. Such a *power*, if called by the proper name, would be denominated *weakness*, and could not belong to God, unless his knowledge was so imperfect that there would be an even chance that one half of his judgments should be right and the other half wrong, and one half of his desires right and the other half wrong; which can not be, if God is perfect in wisdom and goodness, for the author agrees with the Necessitarians in this, that the desires of God are of necessity infinitely good. Now, to say that God can will contrary to his infinitely good desires, is the same as to say that God can will to make Himself both wicked and miserable — which is as absurd as to say God can annihilate Himself; and yet the author will give up the infinite wisdom of God rather than give up the power (weakness) of making himself both wicked and miserable. But what greater excellence would the will of God possess, with the potentiality of committing evil, than without the potentiality? Can there be conceived a greater and more excellent power than a power to do all good? Must this power be united with a power (weakness) to do evil, to entitle it to any moral excellence? The author answers this question in the affirmative. According to him, if the volitions of God arise necessarily from his infinite wisdom and infinite desire to do good, which are themselves necessary, as he acknowledges, then the Deity is not a free agent, and has no moral excellence whatever. Yet the author acknowledges that the infinite wisdom of God is not the less excellent on account of having no potentiality to commit mistakes; nor the infinite good-

ness of God less excellent on account of not possessing the potentiality of forming desires for the production of evil. Why should the divine Will be less excellent, on account of possessing no potentiality to form evil volitions?

But suppose, with the author, that God really possesses this power, what would be its use? What good would it do to will that every sensation of the whole human race should be pain, and every thought a horror, and that, too, contrary to his infinite desire to make them happy? for even this horrible supposition, according to the teaching of the author, might become a reality; and that, too, though God had promised to mankind that He would be merciful and kind to them forever. If the Will had not power to break all promises, express and implied, and alter all determinations previously made by itself, and that, too, contrary to the infinite desire of preserving truth inviolate, it would not be free, and moral agency would be impossible.

Any doctrine from which it may be fairly deduced that the above suppositions may become realities, can not be true. Let the reader judge whether the deduction is fairly made or not.

But it will be said, and, in fact, is said, by the author, that though the Will of God has equal power to do good and to do evil, it is certain that it will never be directed towards the evil; as certain as that physical causes are followed uniformly by their effects. If you ask him how he knows this, when the potentiality of the will is equal both ways—he draws his answer from the doctrine of Necessity; thus adopting the very doctrine that he is endeavoring to refute, and tacitly acknowledging that the doctrine of Contingency furnishes no answer.

When the author forgot his system, he said what is below.	*When the author thought of his system, he said what is below.*
When God created moral agents, He *must* have selected the best system that infinite wisdom could contrive, as He is all-wise and almighty.	When God created moral agents, He might have selected the worst system, instead of the best, from the equal potentiality of his will to do good or to do evil.
If God had conceived of a better system of moral agents than the present, being infinitely good and wise, He *must* have projected it.	If God had conceived of a better system of moral agents than the present, He might not have chosen it, but some other worse one, from the equal potentiality of his will to do good or to do evil.

If God adopted the present system of moral agents, He as omniscient *must* have foreseen that all the evil volitions which actually take place, would certainly take place, and could not be prevented, even by God.

If God adopted the present system of moral agents, He as omniscient must have foreseen that all the evil volitions which actually take place, would certainly take place; yet that they could be prevented, by the equal potentiality of the will of man to do good or to do evil.

God as omniscient foreknew that all future volitions will certainly come to pass.

God as omniscient foreknew that all future volitions might certainly not come to pass.

Physical certainty is resolved into moral certainty when we consider physical events in relation to the divine causality. God foresees with infinite certainty all moral and physical events.

It is not true as a fact, that the same kind and degree of certainty prevail in mental causes, or in the production of volitions, as in physical causes, or the production of material phenomena.—p. 264.

The obedience of the will to the passions is so general in the individual man, and so general in the race of men, that we are impressed with its uniformity. The law of this obedience is correctly stated in the system of Edwards: "The will is as the most agreeable." It is true, also, that he who calculates human conduct in any given circumstances, according to this rule, will generally reach an accurate result.—p. 235.

If we characterize the governance of the will merely from our observations of the succession of desires and volitions, and this succession is one of invariable uniformity, it would be natural and legitimate to characterize it as a necessary governance, according to the analogy of physical phenomena in succession (203); and so it would be characterized, but for consciousness.

If it be asked how the will, being a power indifferent in its nature, can act in obedience to the interests of the being, I reply, that when we distinguish the mind into faculties we do not *separate it into parts*. The will is so conditioned in its relations to the other faculties, and in the *unity of the mind*, that it can not go into action, unless supplied with objects, aims, laws, (and inducements, 279,) by the reason and the sensitivity; and when the same act is commanded by the reason and sensitivity both (216), we have moral certainty as to the character of the volitions.—p. 300.

I experience strong convictions in my reason, and strong impulses or repugnances in my sensitivity; but, most clearly, these affections in *other parts* of my being do not go to make up a volition. I feel that I can will against all motives presented, whether by reason or sensitivity, let the motives be increased to ever such a degree, and in making the volition, there is no resistance overcome, no opposing force whatever (89, 90).

Let the will be distinguished as pure causality, and it can not be conceived

The will now, under an obscured reason and a corrupted sensitivity, is

of as otherwise than indifferent. Will is not the faculty of thought or feeling, and therefore it is indifferent in its very nature (300).

called upon to exert itself for the dispersion of the darkness and the finding of the true law (301). [How a faculty without thought or feeling can be called upon to find anything, is not explained.]

If the faculty of the Will is, as the author has characterized it (300), destitute of thought and feeling, (and I am not disposed to controvert it,) so far from its being itself the very personality, and the only power of the mind which produces effects, it is only a nice piece of mental machinery, contrived by God to enable the sensitivity and the reason, by its instrumentality, to execute the wishes of the one and the designs of the other. But be this as it may, there is another view of the subject, which, I think, alone decides the question in favor of necessity, and against contingency. The author says correctly (p. 297), "The phenomena of the reason and the sensitivity supply the will with objects, laws, rules, and aims of action. Without these, action would be impossible, not for want of a cause of action, but for the want of *something* to do: just as perception would be impossible without objects, not for want of a *perceiving faculty*, but for the want of *something* to perceive." And again (p. 314), "Reason and sensitivity supply the objects and aims of action; Will is the power to act in any of the revealed directions."

This is a great truth, stated with clearness in various other places by the author, and, I think, it never can be successfully controverted. Now, to illustrate the application of this truth, suppose that the Reason and the sensitivity, in harmony, should supply the will with an object and aim of some particular action — eating food, for instance, by a hungry man; we may suppose the man very hungry, and the food presented very pleasant to the taste and known to be very wholesome. The object and aim supplied to the Will, in this case, are to gratify the appetite and preserve the life and health of the hungry man. The Reason and sensitivity supply the Will with no object nor aim to withhold the volition to eat; much less do they supply it with an object and aim of eating arsenic instead of bread: it follows, then, (if "the Will is the power to act in any of the revealed directions," and if without aims and objects its action is impossible,) that, in this case, the Will can not withhold the volition to eat the savory, wholesome food; nor can it put forth the volition to eat the

arsenic, as it is supplied with no aims nor objects of either of these volitions. There is no direction revealed, but the direction to eat the savory food. The Will can not even think of any other direction, and, if reminded of it by another person, still Reason and sensitivity continue to present the same object and aim, and no others. Edwards says, in illustration of his views, that "a woman of great honor and chastity may have the moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave." Our author, not being able to admit this, in consistency with his theory, says: "Now I appeal to every one, do we not believe that this woman, with all her pure and honorable feelings, has still the ability in her personality, or will, to determine to do it. We feel certain that she will not do it, but the certainty is not the result of a barrier of necessity, but of her determination" — pp. 209, 210. How a certainty should arise from her determination before the determination existed, is not explained. Now, in this case, reason and sensitivity supplied only the object and aim to preserve her purity of mind and body, and none whatever to part with it; and, as the author says truly, "that the will can not act without an object or aim furnished by the reason and sensitivity," it follows that, in these circumstances, she could not will to prostitute herself. Besides, to say, as the author does, that this woman, with all her pure and honorable feelings, could will to prostitute herself to her slave, is a contradiction in terms; for pure and honorable feelings are incompatible with willingness to prostitute herself.

Another example given by Edwards is, "A child of great love and duty to his parents may be unable to kill his father." This the author denies on the same ground as before.

Let us try here, for a moment, without going over the former reasoning, how the theory will work in practice, provided it is true. Suppose a son of great love and duty to his parents should, from "the equal potentiality of his will to good and evil actions," will to thrust a dagger to the heart of his father, at the very moment when he felt a strong desire to be kind and dutiful, and when his "moral feelings were shocked and disgusted with (195) the volition and its necessary sequent" — how could we estimate the moral character of the whole transaction, the internal feelings as well as the external act being known? The reason and sensitivity supplied the will with aims of kindness, and furnished no aims of murder. All the motives were the very best. The very statement shows that the imaginary

son is a monster, such as can not exist in the creation of God; and it is as absurd to ask the moral character of such a being as to ask what kind of a man Solomon would have been if he had been born of a different mother. Would he have been wise or foolish; would he have been a male or female?"

But, says the author, "if the son had no power to will to kill his father; if kind actions necessarily proceeded from kind feelings, which were themselves necessary — then he was not a free agent, and his kind volitions had in them nothing morally good, nothing praiseworthy, nothing deserving happiness as their reward. If any praise is due, it belongs of right to the contriver, and not to the contrived. So if a son has undutiful and unkind rebellious feelings towards his father, and no sense of duty to restrain them, and if from this state of mind volitions to act unkindly necessarily spring up, so that the will has no power (while these unkind and rebellious feelings remain and the moral sense continues dormant) to put forth volitions to act kindly and dutifully, from its equal potentiality to do good and to do evil, then the son is not a free agent, and his unkind volitions have in them nothing morally evil, nothing to be found fault with, nothing deserving unhappiness as their consequence. If any fault is in the case at all, it belongs to the contriver, and not to the contrived."

These positions are not announced by the author in the words I have used above, but they seem to me to be taken for granted in his whole system as elementary truths, which need no demonstration. Now, so far from these being elementary truths, believed by everybody, it requires no great ingenuity to show that they are not truths at all, and that they are believed by nobody.

First, as to free agency. It consists in the liberty of willing as we please. No one with full and perfect liberty ever did or ever can will contrary to his pleasure (including always under the term pleasure all the feelings of the sensitivity and the dictates of reason.) To will or do contrary to our pleasure is considered from our early childhood incompatible with perfect liberty.

It is the liberty or free agency of God to have a power to will as He pleases, without any restraint whatever. And I have never yet heard of any one but the author who maintains that God can will contrary to his own infinite desire to do good, and that without that power He would not be a free agent, and so have no moral excellence whatever.

The author appeals to consciousness as a proof that we have the

power to will contrary to our desires and the dictates of our moral sense combined. Did he ever make the experiment? He says a dutiful and affectionate son can will to kill his father. If he makes the experiment, he will find he can no more will to do so, contrary to his strong desires to do no harm to his father, than he can move his arm contrary to his will. He can not even try to move his hand contrary to his will, nor can he try to will contrary to his desire. If he has a wife in the bloom of youth and beauty, on whom he doats with the most tender affection, in whose conjugal fidelity and love for him he has the fullest confidence, let him try to will to use force to prostitute her to her slave, and he will find from his utter inability that his theory of the equal potentiality of the will to do good and to do evil, even when all the feelings of the sensitivity and dictates of the reason are in favor of the good, is utterly false.

Nor is it true that the necessary dependence of will on the desires and dictates of the understanding destroys free agency and all moral excellence, either in fact or in our estimation. Convince the father that the affection of his son for him, and his sense of duty, are so strong that it is utterly impossible for him to put forth a volition to act unkindly, or intend to give the father the least pain: would the father's estimation of his son's moral excellence immediately on this conviction dwindle to naught? Would the father immediately look on his son as a mental machine, unworthy of any moral approbation, undeserving of any happiness either to accompany or to follow the practice of kind acts which arose necessarily out of kind feelings and a high sense of duty, which it was impossible for him not to have, from the nature God had given him, and the manner in which he had been educated, and the circumstances in which he had been placed, without his knowledge or consent? Would not rather the father's heart exult with joy, to become assured that all his paternal care and love had not been in vain, and that he might now remain secure of the affections of his child? and would not his adoration of the great First Cause burn with a holier flame when he contemplated his wisdom and goodness in not leaving the production of moral excellence to the operation of contingent causes, but to causes as certain as those of the physical world? If you should convince him, on the other hand, that all the kind and dutiful conduct of his son did not proceed from affection, but from a contingent power of the will, possessing equal potentiality

to kindness and to rebellion, how would his heart sink within him to discover that what he had taken for the manifestation of solid virtue and permanent moral excellence, was the result of mere contingency, which might change the next moment from kindness to cruelty, from dutiful obedience to insolent rebellion! Is the author a father, what response does his heart give to these questions?

Or suppose one to be the husband of a young, and beautiful, and pure, and affectionate wife, whom he loves with tender and undivided affection: would his estimation of her virtue and moral excellence be diminished in the least by becoming perfectly convinced that her love of virtue, and of purity of mind and body, and the high estimation she had for the sacred nature of the conjugal union, and the unspeakable horror and disgust she felt at the thought of prostituting herself to her slave, all combined to render it impossible for her to will so abhorrent an act? Would he immediately view her as a mere mental machine, utterly devoid of any moral excellence, entitled to no happiness either to accompany or to follow these feelings which she could not prevent, worthy of no approbation either of her own moral sense or that of her husband, unless she possessed the only true ground of free agency, an equal potentiality of will to preserve her purity and self-respect, or to give herself up to prostitution and self-degradation? Let the affectionate husband of a virtuous wife answer these questions, and the doctrine of necessity of will over that of contingency will prevail.

There is one principle, also, which the author himself lays down as a truth which can not be denied, from which the doctrine of Necessity in these cases may fairly be deduced. It is, as stated before, that the will *can not* act without objects and aims furnished by the sensitivity and the reason. Now here, in the case of the wife, no objects nor aims were furnished by either to prostitute herself; every object and aim was to preserve her purity. It follows, therefore, that the will could not put forth a volition to prostitute herself.

So in case of the affectionate and dutiful son: no objects nor aims were supplied to his will to unkind, disobedient acts, much less to murder his father; therefore, such a volition could not be put forth by the will.

So far, then, from there being in these cases an equal poten-

tiality in the will to do good and to do evil, there was no potentiality (weakness) at all to do evil. To will to do good proceeds from strength: to will to do evil proceeds from weakness.

Nor do our moral approbations and disapprobations spring up only towards those things which we believe might have been avoided, by the equal potentiality of the will to do good and to do evil; for these approbations and disapprobations are directed chiefly towards things over which the will has no direct control. If a son should be ever so obedient to his father, and should perform all the offices which are expected by a reasonable father from a son, and it should be discovered that the son, instead of having kind feelings towards his father, and a desire to promote his happiness, had his heart full of ill-will, and a constant desire to see his father dead, that he might inherit his estate, or from any other bad motive: instead of our moral approbation rising up in favor of his kind deeds, strong moral disapprobation would spring up in every breast, against his unkind feelings and evil desires, which we all believe, even the author himself, to be under the law of Necessity, and do not at all depend immediately on the Will, whether the Will has an equal potentiality to do good and to do evil, or not. Thus it will be found, by an examination of other moral conduct, that our approbation and disapprobation, our estimate of moral excellence and moral defect, do not stop at the external action, nor at the volition which produces it, but go back to the desires and wishes of the actor, which are known to be under the law of Necessity, and which, notwithstanding all the author says to the contrary, are universally believed to give rise to the volitions themselves.

But it is continually asked of the Necessitarian, with an air of triumph, Why find fault with any one for that which he could not avoid? It seems to be taken for granted, as a self-evident truth, that it is absurd, unjust, and altogether useless, to find fault with any one for that which it never was in his power to avoid. Now, if this is a truth, then it will follow that we are all guilty of absurdity and injustice alike; for we all, the author as well as others, find great fault with evil desires and evil passions, much more than with evil volitions. And yet the author maintains throughout his work that the passions and desires arise necessarily out of their causes, and could not be different from what they are. Now, the author has no right to expect an answer to this question from

the Necessitarian, any more than the Necessitarian has a right to expect an answer from him. Notwithstanding, I think a complete and satisfactory answer can be given to it on Necessitarian principles. Let us attempt it :

First, it will not be denied that some of our neighbor's passions and desires are faulty ; and second, that God has so formed us that we can see those faults, or know they exist, by external signs ; and also, that He has so formed us that, on seeing them, we feel a sentiment of disapprobation. If the question "Why find fault" means, what object have we in view when we find a fault in our neighbor, and feel disapprobation, the answer is, we have no object in view ; for this discovery of our neighbor's fault, and feeling of disapprobation accompanying the discovery, do not arise from our determination, but from the constitution of our nature, as involuntarily as any of our other judgments or sensations.

The question, then, "Why do we find fault," etc., can only mean, what object had God in view, when He constituted us so that we find or see our neighbor's faults, even those that do not depend on his Will, and so that we feel a moral disapprobation of them as soon as they are found.

No finite intelligence can comprehend and explain all the objects an infinitely wise Being had in view when He constituted our moral and intellectual nature ; but this far we can understand, that every contrivance belonging to it plainly leads to an increase of knowledge and virtue — and none more so than seeing moral defects or faults, and feeling disapprobation of them. Every such operation of mind increases our moral strength or virtue, and leaves our moral being less defective than it was before. It advances our creation towards perfection. When we are born our moral and intellectual creation is just begun. We are then one entire deficiency, having no knowledge, no virtue, or moral power, no feeling of moral approbation or disapprobation. We are an utter blank. How God operates to inaugurate feeling and thought, we know not ; but after they are begun, we see plainly that He has laid his plans so that our creation can not fail to advance to entire completion.

I have frequently heard it asked how anything can come out of the hands of an infinitely wise and holy Creator, defective in any manner ? The mistake is, to suppose that the first man's crea-

tion was completed at once, and that our creation is completed at birth; whereas it is then we begin to be in the hands of God for creation. The infinite perfections of God justify us in believing that He never will put any part of his creation out of his creating hand incomplete or defective. Nor is this conclusion derived merely from what appears to us due to the perfections of God; we are enabled likewise to see that a plan has been adopted by God himself, from which our complete creation in knowledge, virtue, and happiness, will be secured. What this plan is has already been shown (pp. 32, 65), and if there was no other proof of the being of God than this plan, full of so many beautiful and beneficent contrivances, this alone would produce perfect conviction in any mind comprehending it. For even if we could suppose that something could spring into existence out of nothing — that is, without a cause (which is itself infinitely absurd and impossible) — still, even then, there would be an infinite number of chances to one, that blind Chance would not produce a system manifesting the most beautiful arrangement and harmony of parts, as if it proceeded from the highest intelligence.

But it will be said that "finding fault" is not merely discovering our neighbor's faults, and feeling a moral disapprobation of them, but expressing that disapprobation in the form of blame, plainly implying that we think the person blamed had it in his power to avoid the thing for which he is blamed. It is urged that this must be so; for it has become a maxim with all men, even the Necessitarians themselves, that "A man ought not to be blamed for what he can not avoid." This maxim is undoubtedly correct as understood and practiced upon by all. When written so as to be free from ambiguity, it is as follows: "A person ought not to be blamed for what he can not avoid if he pleases;" that is, if he pleased or desired to avoid a thing, and could not, then it was not his fault, but if his want of power to avoid it depended on the want of desire to avoid it, then it was his fault. The disapprobation of our moral sense springs up in a moment, when we discover that the person's desires were in favor of the evil act, and we do not stop to inquire whether those desires were necessary or contingent. Moreover, the stronger the desire to do the blameworthy act, the higher does our disapprobation rise, whether we are Necessitarians, or advocates of contingency.

It is wonderful that an acute logician should bring forward the

common mode of speaking, concerning crimes committed — "The criminal might have avoided committing the crime if he had pleased"—as a proof of the universal belief that the agent has the unconditional power of avoiding all criminal acts, and all good acts, too, when the very expression contains a condition implying the doctrine of Necessity as strongly as if it asserted that the crime could not be avoided under the circumstances.

If the common people say that any son of competent bodily strength can murder his father if he pleases, certainly they do not mean that he can do it if he does not please. On the contrary, it logically means that he can not do it if he does not please. And to a man not drilled in metaphysics, it would appear as absurd to say he could do it if he did not please, as to say he could do it if he did not will to do it; for it never enters into any man's mind to will contrary to his own pleasure. (I wish it always to be understood that I mean by pleasure, as here used, all the pleasure we derive from the gratification of our senses, of our passions, of our appetites, and of our moral sense.)

The gratification of the moral sense, in the very early part of our existence, forms no part of our pleasure; for as yet the moral sense is not created: and even after God has begun to create it, we often think that the gratification of the appetites will be more pleasant than the gratification of the moral sense. The correction of this mistake is gradually made, as the work of creation goes on, by our own experience, and by the testimony of others. This is the means which God employs to create our moral sense up to such perfection and strength that it becomes forever after the undisputed ruler of all our moral conduct. If this seldom or never occurs in this life, we are still sure that in our continued existence we will be under the same divine and benignant administration that we are under here; and the unchangableness of the divine perfections affords us the most consolatory evidence that a plan so wisely and beneficently contrived, and so undeviatingly prosecuted during our whole lives, will not be abandoned in the next life until it is brought to complete perfection.

But it will still be said, Suppose it is true that the external act arises necessarily from the volition, the volition from the desire, the desire from the too high estimate we make of the value of the object desired or the wrong estimate of the means to attain the object, the wrong estimate from the want of sufficient reason to judge correctly,

the want of sufficient reason from our unfinished creation; and suppose, also, that God, with the purpose of strengthening our moral sense and advancing its creation towards completion, causes a feeling of disapprobation of any one of these particulars to spring up involuntarily in our minds: what is the use of giving expresion to that feeling in the form of blame, since all the particulars are but links in the chain of necessity, originating in God himself, and not one of which can be broken or changed in the slightest degree, by anything that we can do or say?

If this question means, What utility have we in view when we give expression to our feelings of moral disapprobation, the answer will be various, according to our intelligence, and our feelings of kindness or unkindness towards the person blamed. If we have no regard for him, our object will be merely the pleasure of letting others know our sentiments, or inducing them to believe that we would not be guilty of such conduct ourselves. If we feel ill-will towards him, a part of our object, at least, will be to give him pain.

Let it be our beloved child, or our dear friend, whose fault we have discovered, and our object in expressing our disapprobation will be not to change the past, but to introduce new motives, which he would not otherwise have, to operate on the future, and prevent a repetition of the same conduct. This object corresponds exactly with the doctrine of Necessity, which teaches that with similar motives and similar circumstances, similar conduct will ensue, and with different motives and different circumstances, different conduct will ensue. This object corresponds also with the object of God in causing us to feel and express disapprobation. He has so formed us that we consider the approbation of our fellows a highly desirable object to obtain and preserve, and consequently the expression of their disapprobation, as soon as known, is certain to operate as a new motive and a new desire, in opposition to the desire which produced the preceding faulty conduct; and thus we are morally improved, thus our creation is advanced.

Nor is the fault found by an enemy without its use. God has formed us all, even in the early stages of our creation, with a strong desire of moral excellence; and when a fault is made known to us, even by an enemy, it is half removed. And it was said with much propriety, by a sage of antiquity, that to aid us

in detecting our faults, we each need a true friend or a bitter enemy, as none but these two have sufficient courage to tell us our faults.

The question, however, may be fairly asked, though without any hope of a satisfactory answer, "What is the use of blame, or finding fault," if "the will retains an equal potentiality to do good and to do evil, without feeling the slightest resistance in overcoming the new motives introduced into the mind by the blame occasioned by the former conduct, however strong those motives may be"? The true doctrine on this point appears to be, that there would be no use in expressing our moral disapprobation, if the person blamed could not avoid similar conduct in future by the introduction into his mind of new motives. It is the possibility of our faults being removed that renders the blame of them just and useful, and not at all the possibility of our not having been faulty. Our being faulty depends on the unfinished state of our creation, and the removal of our faults depends on their discovery either by ourselves or others. God has placed our friends, and our enemies, too, in positions from which they can detect many of our faults or defects which escape our notice, and the very pain which we feel on the discovery of our faults becomes, in the providence of God, a means of removing them.

It may be asked how a knowledge of our faults can tend to remove them, when the faults are in the desires, which do not depend on the will. True, our desires do not depend on our will, but they depend on our knowledge; our desire for any particular object is dependent on the estimate we make of its value, and when we discover that our estimate was erroneous, our desire changes, of course. And when our desires change, our volitions and conduct change with them. The judgment is invariably corrected on the discovery of a fault. And when our judgment shall be so far advanced in its creation as to form a correct estimate of the value of every object of pursuit, our desires for each object will be neither too strong nor too weak, and our volitions and conduct will correspond with our desires, and the advancement of our whole moral character will keep pace with the advancement of our judgment in truly estimating things.